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ABSTRACT
The Visual Artists Rights Act ('VARA") is a piece of modern legislation preceded by a rich history, with a
significant gap. As early as the 1400's, patents were offered as economic incentive to develop new
processes in the trades and applied arts. By the 1700's, the Statute of Anne became the first statute to
protect the literary work of individual creators. The Engravers' Act of 1735 soon followed, expanding
this protection to include the first works of visual art and providing the precursor to the modern right of
integrity. Millar v. Taylor was the landmark case that alluded to moral rights protection and found
copyright existed at common law; however, it was replaced by statutory copyright in Donaldson v.
Beckott. From then on, only the statute could prescribe protection. This effectively closed the door on
moral rights protection in the United States, because the Donaldson interpretation provided the
groundwork for interpretation of the first United States copyright statute. Until VARA, the United
States copyright law focused on economic protection, disregarding most other values. This article traces
moral rights through the early intellectual property law history, discusses the importance of the rights
granted, and argues that VARA is most useful if jurists and legislators become aware of the history and
the legislation itself.
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How WE LOST OUR MORAL RIGHTS AND THE DOOR CLOSED
ON NON-ECONOMIC VALUES IN COPYRIGHT
SusAN P. LIEMER*

INTRODUCTION

In 1997, a sculptor named Jan Martin won a lawsuit against the City of
Indianapolis' using a little-known federal statute called the Visual Artists Rights Act
("VARA').2 The court found the City violated certain rights that the statute granted to
Mr. Martin,3 when bulldozers destroyed his sculpture 4 in the name of urban
development. 5 During the damages phase of the lawsuit, the court refused to award to
Mr. Martin the enhanced damages available under the statute, 6 because, after all, the
City had been unaware of the statute.7 The Seventh Circuit had no problem affirming
the District Court.8 How is it possible that ignorance of the law was a valid excuse?
*Director of Lawyering Skills and Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law;
B.A., Princeton University; J.D., University of Virginia. Thank you to all the participants of the Legal
Writing Institute's 2005 Writers Workshop, particularly Professors William Y. Chin, Susan Hanley
Kosse, Sarah Ricks, and Louis J. Sirico. Thank you also to Professors Laurel Wendt and James Duggan
for expert library assistance.
' Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp. 625 (S.D. Ind. 1997) [hereinafter Martini; 4 F. Supp.
2d 808 (S.D. Ind. 1998) [hereinafter Martin I1; 28 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Ind. 1998) [hereinafter Martin
Ii, affd, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Martin III.
2 VisualArtists Right Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506 (2000)).
'3 Martin 1, 982 F. Supp. at 638 ("Martin has proved all five elements of his claim under VARA...
."). The specific right at issue in Martin, the right of integrity, is described infra pp. 4-5.
4Martin 1 982 F. Supp. at 629 ('[O]n or about July 20, 1995, Symphony #1 was demolished by
Jordan Demolition [Company].").
Id. at 628 (explaining the City acquired the land on which the sculpture stood "in accordance with
its Urban Renewal Development Plan").
6Martin I!, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 811 ("Martin cannot recover enhanced statutory damages ... for willful
infringement."). Damages in VARA suits are the same as those for copyright infringement, found in 17
U.S.C. §§ 504(c), 505 (2000). A successful plaintiff may choose either actual or statutory damages. 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Statutory damages may range from $500 to $20,000, and if a violation is "willful," the
court may increase damages to a maximum of $100,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), (2).
7Martin 1, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 811 ("Martin has not produced evidence showing that the City had
knowledge or reason to know that Martin's interest.., was protected .. "); MartinIV 192 F.3d at 614
("As far as we can tell from the record, those VARA rights were unknown to the City."). In Martin III
the court at least gave some more analytical reasoning, applying copyright requirements to moral rights
damages, without citing any authority for doing so. Martin 11, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 ("the maxim
'ignorance of the law is no defense' has no application in the realm of enhanced statutory damages for
copyright infringement.").
8
Martin IV 192 F.3d at 614.
In spite of the City's conduct resulting in the intentional destruction of the
sculpture, we do not believe .... particularly given the fact that the issue of VARA
rights hadnot been raiseduntil this suit,that the City's conduct was 'willful'... so as
to entitle the plaintiff to enhanced damages.
Id. (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the court awarded Martin $131,252.55 in attorney's fees
and costs, Martin 111 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1107, after stating that the statutory damages it did
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Answering this question requires taking a broad view of United States intellectual
property law, including a look back at some details in its history. While others have
studied fully the history of Anglo-American copyright, 9 the paucity of references in the
histories to the type of rights granted by VARA is remarkable. And so I have retraced
that history, analyzing how the type of rights VARA provides fit into it.
In Part I of this article, to provide the necessary background information, I explain
briefly the rights granted by VARA. Then in Part I, I look back at a time in history
when intellectual property itself and Anglo-American intellectual property law concepts
were first developing into their modern forms. I argue that at that time the door was
open to allow for the development of both non-economic interests, including those
protected by VARA, and economic interests, such as those protected by copyright. That
was a time when both sets of interests seemed to sit more easily side-by-side and even
intertwine in the minds and opinions of the common law judges. Intellectual property
law concepts were at an early evolutionary stage, and ideas that could evolve into both
VARA rights and copyright swirled around in the same primordial soup of AngloAmerican intellectual property law. There were many potential threads of intellectual
property law developing at that time, and I focus my analysis specifically on how the
potential for moral rights' development was a part of that history.
In Part I1, I identify the specific moment when the door to that development closed,
profoundly impacting the evolution of American intellectual property law for over 200
years. This historic turn of events so effectively cut off the development of an entire line
of legal doctrine protecting non-economic intellectual property interests, that it was easy
for a federal court in the 1990's to excuse a defendant's ignorance of its feeble reemergence. And so I suggest in Part IV that judicial education about this history could
make the federal judiciary more comfortable with VARA and its values and more adept
at applying it well. In addition, as a new evolution takes place in American intellectual
property law today, and many different concepts swirl in the mix of laws that are
considered and tried, there is an important opportunity to make sure moral rights are
not lost again.

I. So You'vE NEVER HEARD OF VARA?
The law that the court excused the City of Indianapolis for not knowing was the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, or VARA.10 It grants to an "author of a work of visual
art"1 1 the rights of attribution and integrity. 12 The term "author" is used here in the
broad copyright sense of the word, to include an author or an artist.13 A "work of visual
award '[did] not cover the loss," and that it was hoping to deter other municipalities from
"wantonly destroying works of art." Martin I, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 812.
9 Soo infra note 68.
1017 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
'1 § 106A(a).
12 d.
13
The copyright statute does not define "author," only "works of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(2000). On the meaning of "author," see Michael Birnhack, The Dead Sea Scrolls Case: Who Is An
Author, 2001 E.I.P.R. 23(3), 128, 131-32 (discussing the definition of an "author"); James D.A. Boyle,
The Search for An Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 Am. U.L. REV. 625, 629-30 (1988)
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art," however, has a very narrow, specific definition:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved,
or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the
author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of
200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author. 14
So the types of visual art for which VARA gives protection are what were
traditionally known as the "fine arts,"15 i.e., painting, sculpture, art prints, and, more
recently, art photography. These works of art are one-of-a-kind or very limited edition
16
pieces, valued for their uniqueness.
The law also limits the meaning of a "work of visual art" by clarifying what it is not:
A work of visual art does not include17
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine,
(analyzing how "the author is different than other workers"); Sharon Connelly, Authorbip, Ownership,
and ControtBalancingthe Economic andArtisticIssues Raised by the Martha Graham Copyright Case,
15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 837, 839, 863-64 (2005); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept
ofAuthorshii in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1072-74 (2003) [hereinafter
Ginsburg, Authorshipin ComparativeCopyright];Marci A. Hamilton, Copyrightat the Supreme Court:
A JurisprudenceofDeference, 47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 317, 326 (2000) [hereinafter Hamilton,
Deference] (arguing the Supreme Court has rejected "an author-centered vision of the copyright law");
Peter Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright:The Metamorphosisof 'Authorship," 1991 DuKE L.J. 455,
468-71 (1991) (examining how the law received concepts of authorship from its cultural context);
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-Stories:"Narrative'sImplicationsforMoralRights and Copyrights
JointAuthorship Doctrine, 75 S.CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) [hereinafter Kwall, 'Author-Stories'] ("[T]he
author's voice is one that has been submerged in the development of copyright law ....");David
Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls;:Authors-hip and Originality,38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 7-13
(2001).
14 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
15See Christine Haight Farley, JudgingArt,79 TUL.L. REV. 805, 839 n. 140 (2005) (asserting "art is
oppositionally defined in law and elsewhere with binary notions such as high art versus low art, art
versus craft, art versus entertainment, and fine art versus popular art"); Pete Singer, The Three Stooges
LatestAct:Attempting to Define the Scope ofProtection the FirstAmendmentProvides to Works ofArt
Depicting Celebnrities,27 DAYTON L. REV. 313, 330-31 (2002) (listing qualities of fine art, as opposed to
popular art, which the California Supreme Court examined).
16See UnitedStates v. IntlHarvesterCo., 23 C.C.P.A. 55, 59 (1935) (considering trial testimony
asserting that "Fine arts is something that is determined very often by the scarcity of the subject, or the
future appreciation of it."); Christopher J. Robinson, The "RecognizedStature" Standardinthe Visual
Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1936 (2000) ("Fine art is unique among the arts in one
important sense. A disproportionate percentage of the value of a work of fine art is in the physical object
created, rather than the exploitation of derivatives or copies.").
17But see Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 533 (2001) (finding clay
model for bronze sculpture was a work of visual art in its own right).
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newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic
publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive,
18
covering, or packaging material or container; ....
This negative definition prevents VARA from protecting purely commercial or massproduced works. 19
Thus, VARA applies to the creators of paintings, sculptures, limited edition prints,
and exhibition photographs. 20 The City of Indianapolis apparently did not know there
was a special law for sculptors and their ilk before it sent in the bulldozers.
What VARA grants to these creators are the right of attribution 21 and the right of
23
integrity. 22 The right of attribution allows an artist to put his name on his own work
and to prevent his name from being put someone else's work. 24 The right of attribution
also allows an artist to prevent the use of his name on his work if the work has been
modified or distorted in a way that would be "prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation." 25 Thus, VARA allows the artist to maintain control over which works will be
attributed to him and which will not, giving him some control over his reputation as an
artist.

26

18 17

U.S.C. § 101.

19 See Silberman v. Innovation Luggage, Inc., 2003 WL 1787123, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2003)

("[T]here is no indication that in passing VARA Congress meant to penalize purchasers of mass-produced
posters who treated them with less than the respect due to original works of art.").
20 Cf Kwall, 'Author-Stories," supra note 13, at 30 (arguing that "[b]y limiting its protections to
only certain categories of visual art, VARA . . . privileges the voices of certain authors over others");
Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Moral Right andMoralRighteousness, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 65, 80
(1997) (asserting VARA conflicts with the egalitarian tradition of copyright law).
2117 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1), (2) (2000).
22 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3).
23 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(a) ("[T]he author of a work of visual art-shall have the right-to claim
authorship of that work .... ); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United
States: Caughtin the CrossfireBetween CopyrightandSection43(a), 377 WASH. L. REV. 985, 995 (2002)
[hereinafter Kwall, Attribution] ("The objective of the right of attribution is to insure that the creator of
a work receives recognition as the author.").
24 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(b) ([T]he author of a work of visual art-shall have the right-.., to
prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not
create."); see also Kwall, Attribution, supranote 23, at 985 ([P]eople should not receive attribution for
something that is not their creation.").
25 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2).
26 See Kwall, Attribution, supra note 23, at 994 ([F]or many creators, some qualities, such as
professional reputation and artistic dignity, are more important than money ..
"); Susan P. Liemer,
UnderstandingArtists' Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 47-49 (1998) [hereinafter
Liemer, Prime . But see Kwall, 'Author-Stories," supra note 13, at 25 (distinguishing between an
author's dignity and an author's reputation).
On securing reputation protection via trademark law, see Jane C. Ginsburg, TheAuthors Name as
a Trademark: A PerversePerspectivo on the Moral Right ofPaternity, 23 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
379 (2005); Randolph Stuart Sergent, BuildingReputationalCapital:The Right ofAttribution Under
Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 45 (1994-95).
On the recent abridgement of the right of attribution outside the scope of VARA, in DastarCorp v.
Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), see Marshall Leaffer, Life After Eldred: The
Supreme Court and the Future of Copyright,30 WM. MITCHELLL. REV. 1597, 1613-15 (2004); Tyler T.
Ochoa, Rights ofAttribution, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and the Copyright Public Domain, 24
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Likewise, the right of integrity allows an artist to prevent someone else from
modifying his work without permission, 27 again if it would "be prejudicial to his or her
honor or reputation." 28 And the right of integrity allows an artist to prevent outright
destruction of the work, 29 provided it is a work of "recognized stature." 30 In this way,
VARA allows the artist to maintain aesthetic control of the physical work, which in turn
gives him some additional control over his reputation as an artist. 31 It was ignorance of
this last right enumerated in the statute, an artist's right to prevent destruction of his
art, for which the Seventh Circuit was quick to excuse the City of Indianapolis.
Note that VARA grants these rights to artists, and these rights are personal to the
individual artist, 32 lasting for a lifetime.33 These rights do not follow the ownership of
the physical work of art, nor do they follow the ownership of the copyright. 34 Both the
artwork and the copyright can be held in other hands; the right of attribution and the
3 5
right of integrity will still lie with the artist.
WHITTIER L. REV. 911, 926 (2003).
2717 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(a) (2000); see Thomas P. Heide, The Moral Right ofIntegrity and the

GlobalInformationInfrastructure Time for a NewApproach ,2 U.C. DAVIS J. INTL L. & PoL'Y 211, 22951 (1996) (providing an overview of the right of integrity in the United States, United Kingdom,
Germany, and France).
28 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(a).
29 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(b). But see Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Cos., 311 F.3d 979, 986
(2002) (finding a mural covered with white sealant was not destroyed, "itsimply disappeared"); English
v. BFC & R E. 11th Street LLC, 1997 WL 746444, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding total obstruction of
murals that does not touch them neither modifies nor destroys them). Traditionally, the right of
integrity in other countries did not protect against destruction, only modification. LaCasse et Welcome
c. Abbe Quenard, CA Paris, 1934 D.P.II 385; Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81-82 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996) ("Destruction is seen as less harmful than the continued
display of deformed or mutilated work that misrepresents the artist .. ").
'3017 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(b); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
("[T]he recognized stature requirement is best viewed as a gate-keeping mechanism-protection is
afforded only to those works of art that art experts, the art community, or society in general views as
possessing stature."), affdin part, vaeatodin part,rev'din part,71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995); Martin IV,
192 F.3d at 612 ("Recognized stature' is a necessary finding under VARA in order to protect a work of
visual art from destruction."); Pollara v. Seymour, 206 F. Supp. 2d 333, 337 (2002) (finding no recognized
stature for hand-painted portable mural used as backdrop to exhibit booth, because artist had no
intention to preserve it for later display); see also Robinson, supra note 16, at 1963-66 (arguing the
recognized stature requirement should be dropped).
31
See Liemer, Primer,supra note 26, at 50-52.
32 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) ("Only the author of a work of visual art has the rights conferred by
subsection (a) in that work ....");see also Justin Hughes, The PersonalityInterest ofArtists and
Inventors in IntellectualProperty,16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 114 (1998) (suggesting art may be a
surrogate of the artist's self); Kwall, 'Author-Stories," supra note 13, at 23 (stating "this doctrine is
concerned with protecting the author's personal dignity and the human spirit reflected in her artistic
creations."). See generallyBurton Ong, Why MoralRights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of
IntegrityRights,26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 297, 298-99 (2003) (analyzing both intrinsic and instrumental
values behind moral rights).
33 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d) (2000) ("[T]he rights conferred by subsection (a) shall endure for a term
consisting of the life of the author.").
3 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (granting the right of attribution and integrity "whether or not the author is
the copyright owner").
3, See Robinson, supranote 16, at 1939 (explaining these rights "acknowledge that an artist has
•..a creative persona that is injected into the work of art at creation and which remains a part of the
work despite his physical relinquishment of the object to others"); Shaw v. Rizzoli Int'l Publ'ns, Inc., 1999
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Congress passed VARA in 1990. Fifteen years have come and gone, and only about
as many cases have been decided under this federal statute. Artists themselves often do
not know about this law,3 6 waive their rights,3 7 or find it too costly to assert their rights
in federal court.38 Most VARA plaintiffs have lost in court, which may further discourage
9
others from filing lawsuits under VARA.3
Congress passed VARA to help United States law comply with the Berne
Convention. 40 This intellectual property treaty was over one hundred years old and had
over one hundred other signatories before the United States signed it.41 The Berne
Convention does require signatory nations to grant artists the right of attribution and
the right of integrity. 42 Despite VARA, the sufficiency of United States compliance with
43
the Berne Convention is at least questionable.
WL 160084, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating "economic harm is not the type of injury protected by VARA").
3 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS IN VISUAL

ARTWORK, (Oct. 24, 1996), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/exsum.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005)
(acknowledging "the low level of VARA awareness"); RayMing Chang, Revisiting the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990.A Follow-up SurveyAboutAwareness and Waiver 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 129,
144 (2005) (reporting little change in artists' awareness of VARA between 1995 and 2003).
3
7 Ld. (reporting 40% of over 1,000 artists answering a written survey "said waiver clauses were
part of contracts for commissioned works"); Chang, supranote 36, at 144-45 (reporting a small increase
in artists' awareness of VARA waivers from 1995 to 2003).
38 Id. (reporting " [s]everal comments remarked that the law was unenforceable, largely because
enforcement is too costly").
39
' The statute has, however, generated much scholarship. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 1939
n.22 ("Moral rights.., are a favorite of academics, and articles on the subject far outnumber the cases in
which moral rights are invoked.").
40 Compare Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention], and Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988), with Visual Artists Right Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411,
412, 501, 506 (2000)).
As I wrote previously, " [t]he impetus ... to join the Berne Convention has been explained in terms
of ensuring protection of American artists, particularly writers, in the global marketplace ... as well as
sustained efforts by interested members of the arts community." Liemer, Primer,supra note 26, at 46
n.34 (citing Robert J. Sherman, The Visua]Artis Rights Act ofl990:AmericanArtists BurnedAgain,
17 CARDOzo L. REV. 373, 374 n.ll, 398-401 (1995); Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights Protection and
Resale Royalties for Visual Art in the UnitedStates."Development and CurrentStatus, 12 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 387, 407 (1994)); see also Cambra E. Stern, A Matter ofLife or Death: The Visual
Artists Rights Act and the Problem of Postmortem MoralRikhts, 51 UCLA L. REV. 849, 857 (2004)
(explaining the impetus to join the Berne Convention was the United States' "copyright-based
industries" wanting more protection for their products in international markets).
41 United States Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Treaty Affairs, Treaties in Force,
357-58, Jan. 1, 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal-affairs/tif 01d.pdf.
1 Berne Convention, supra note 40, at Art. 6 bis, 1.
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
Id.
43 See William Belanger, US. Compliance with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO. MASON L. REV. 373,
398-401 (1995); Janet Fries & Michael J. Remington, Beware ofMutant Copyrrht:JustieeScalia Issues
a Warningin the Dastar Decision,IP L. & Bus., Sept. 2003, at 70; Kwall, Attribution, supra note 23, at
1025 ("our legal system has failed to protect the attribution interest in an independent, and doctrinally
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When Congress debated the adoption of VARA, 44 media attention focused on Ted
Turner's efforts to ensure he could add color to the old, black and white films in his
collection. 45 When the VARA bill passed, it was tacked onto a lengthy bill authorizing
eighty-five new federal judges and other court reform. 46 Upon codification, it simply was
inserted between existing, unrelated sections of the federal copyright law. 47 The court in
Martin v. City of Indianapolisreferred to VARA as "a stepchild of our copyright laws
"48

And so, it is not surprising that a defendant in a VARA lawsuit might not have
heard, before reading the Complaint, about this statute and the special rights it grants to
creators of visual art. It remains surprising, however, that a defendant could argue
successfully in a federal Court of Appeals that ignorance of this law was sufficient to
excuse statutorily-prescribed damages.
The Anglophone world generally refers to VARA rights as artists' "moral rights,"
translating loosely from the French term droit moral.49 "In this context, 'moral' is not the
opposite of immoral or even amoral. The term simply conveys an element of ethics or
societal interest."50 In addition to the right of attribution (le droit A ]a paternit5l)and
honest, manner"); Teresa Laky, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.: Widening the Gap
Between United States IntellectualPropertyLawandBerne Convention Requirements, 14 SETON HALL
J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 441 (2004); Ochoa, supra note 26, at 924-27 (doubting Dastarmeets Berne
Convention moral rights requirements); Ruth L. Okediji, Through the Years: The Supreme Courtand
the Copyright Clause, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1633, 1649-50 (2004) (referring to the United States'
"already weak compliance scheme for the protection of moral rights under the Berne Convention");
Leaffer, supranote 26, at 1615 (asserting even the United States' minimalist compliance with Berne has
recently been undermined); Natalie C. Suhl, Moral Rights Protectionin the United States Under the
Berne Convention:A FictionalWork? 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203 (2002); David
S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and TrademarkLaw in the Now Mi ennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1659, 1696 n.209 (questioning "whether the United States is adhering to its obligations under the
Berne Convention").
44See Sherman, supra note 40, at 401-09 (providing an overview of VARA's legislative history).
5
1
ee Janine V. McNally, CongressionalLimits on TechnologicalAlterations to Film: The Pubhlie
Interestand the Artists'MoralRight,5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 129 (1990); Don Shannon, PanelWeighs Moral
Rights'ofFilm Alteration,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1989, at 1 (reporting Senate sub-committee hearings on
moral rights). For a French court's perspective on adding color to black-and-white movies, see Huston c.
La Cinq, Cass. le civ., May 28, 1991, J.C.P. 1991,11, 21731 (a French court enjoining the showing of Ted
Turner's colorized version of John Huston's movie, the Asphalt Jungle).
46 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990); see also Kwall,
'Author-Stories,"supra note 13, at 27 n.112 (describing relevant party politics).
17 The main provisions of VARA are in 17 U.S.C. § 106A, which was inserted between § 106
(granting the traditional bundle of rights known as copyright: the exclusive right to reproduce,
distribute, perform, display, and make derivative works from a copyrighted work) and § 107 (codifying
the long-standing fair use exception).
8
Martin IV 192 F.3d at 611; see also Cort, 311 F.3d at 985 (stating "American law has resisted
recognizing moral rights").
9
4 See Russell J. DaSilva, DroitMoraland the Amoral Copyright.'A ComparisonofArtists'Rights
in France and the UnitedStates, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 1, 2 n.7 (1980) (citing Dominique
Giocanti, Moral Rights:Authors'Protectionand Business Needs, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 627, 627 n.1
(1975)). France has long been considered the leader in this area of the law. Id.; Sherman, supranote 40,
at 389 n.92; Benjamin Davidson, Lost in Translation:DistinguishingBetween French and Anglo
American Natural Rights in Literary Property, and How Dastar Proves That the Difference Still
Matters, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 583 (2005).
5
0See Liemer, Primer, supranote 26, at 42 (citing RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1249
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the right of integrity (Je droit au respeet de ]'ouevre52), which are the most commonly

recognized moral rights, some countries recognize the right of disclosure 53 (Je droit de
divulgatio&4), the right of withdrawal 55 (le droit de retraitou de repentir'6), and resale
royalty rights 57 (le droit de suite58). There are many other ways in which moral rights

are more expansive in other countries, including the duration, 59 a lack of waivers, 60 the
types of work protected, 61 and applicability to works for hire, 62 i.e., works made for an
63
employer.
So the question remains, if artists' moral rights are well-established, mainstream

(2d ed. 1993) (defining "moral? as "of, pertaining to, or concerned with the principle or rules of right
conduct.., ethical"); Rebecca J. Morton, Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.: A FairTest ofthe VisualArtists
Rights Act, 28 CONN. L. REV. 875, 912 (1996) ("Traditional moral rights theory... 'presupposes a broad
societal interest in the creation of fine art."' (citation omitted)); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyrightand
the Mora]Right:Is anAmericanMarriagePossible ,38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 n.6 (1985) [hereinafter Kwall,

Marriage].
51See, e.g., Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, 2723 B.L.D. 197, art. 6 (France)
[hereinafter Law No. 57-298]. The French term used to be translated directly into English as "the right
of paternity," but the gender-neutral term "right of attribution" is now used more frequently. The
French term may, however, more closely capture the nature of the relationship between art and artist.
See Liemer, Primer,supranote 26, at 43, n.15 (comparing artist's view of harm to his art to harm to a
loved one).
52See, e.g., Law No. 57298, art. 6.
53See Liemer, Primer,supra note 26, at 52-54.
51See, e.g., Law No. 57-298, art. 56. See infra p. 25, on the similarity between Anglo-American
copyright law's right to decide when to publish and the French droitde divulgation; see also Heide, supra
note 27, at 245-52 (examining the French droit de divulgation).
55See gene-rallyLiemer, Primer,supra note
56See, e.g., Law No. 57-298, art. 32.

26, at 54-55;

57See generallyLILIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, THE DROITDE SUITE IN LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
PROPERTY, A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1991); Liemer, Primer,supranote 26, at 55-56; Michael B. Reddy,
The Droitdo Suite: WhyAmerican FineArtists Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LoY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 509 (1995).
5SSee, e.g., California Art Preservation Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 987 (2005); Law No. 57-298, art. 42.
59In France, for example, moral rights are perpetual. Law No. 57-298, art. 6. Heirs are assumed to
be carrying out the wishes of the artist, not imposing their own decisions. See RALPH E. LERNER &
JUDITH BRESSLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 948 (2d
ed. 1998); see also Stern, supra note 40, at 868-69 (analyzing current problems arising from differing
durations for moral rights in federal and state legislation in the United States).
60
For example, moral rights are not waivable in France, Law No. 57-298, art. 6, or in Germany,
Law of Sept. 9, 1965, v. 4.7.1965 (BGB1. I S.2098).
61 See, e.g., Soc. Le Chant de Monde c. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox Americaine Twentieth Century,
CA Paris, Jan. 13, 1953, Gaz. Pal. 1953, 2, pan. jurispr., 191 (France) (granting moral rights protection to
classical music composer Shostakovich).
62
By definition in the United States, a "work for hire" is not a "work of visual art," 17 U.S.C. § 101,
and so it is not protected by VARA. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85-89 (2d Cir. 1995),
eort,denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996) (analyzing "work for hire" in a VARA context); Martin - 982 F. Supp.
625 at 36 (also analyzing "work for hire" in a VARA context); Marina Santilla, United States'Meral
Rights Developments in EuropeanPerspective,1 MARQ.INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 89, 99 (1997) (reviewing
effect of no work for hire doctrine on European moral rights).
( 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a work for hire as "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment"); see also Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740-41
(1989) (defining "scope of employment" for artists by applying the common law of agency).
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law in some other countries,6 4 why is VARA so tenuous in the United States as to make
a federal court reluctant to apply it? How did we lose our moral rights? Did we ever
have them to begin with?

II.

MORAL RIGHTS' ANCESTOR STOOD ON AN EARLIER EVOLUTIONARY BRANCH OF THE
LAW

A. Early Monopoly
The story 65 of intellectual property law 66 in the common law countries generally
starts in 1476,67 with the introduction of printing in England, by William Caxton.68 The
King issued "letters of patent," allowing monopolies for a fixed number of years, to
individuals who could bring to England and develop new processes in the trades and
applied arts. 69 Printing was one of those trades.
64See Cheryl Swack, SafeguardingArtisticCreationand the CulturalHeritage:A Comparison of
Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361, 364 (1998)
("[M]oral rights in France and continental Europe have evolved to protect not only an artist's personal
right in the overall integrity of his work, but .. .have protected Europe's cultural property."); SIVA
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS, THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT
THREATENS CREATIVITY 26 (2001) (asserting "European nations have consistently granted a higher level
of protection to authors and artists than American laws have").
6 On the use of narratives to help the judiciary broaden its perspective on moral rights in our
intellectual property law, see generally Kwall, 'Author-Stories,"supra note 13.
66 On the broader, contemporaneous development of visual artists as individuals with interests
distinct from those of their patrons, see Evelyn Lincoln, Invention and Authorship in Early Modern
Italian Visual Culture,52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093 (2003); Suhl, supranote 43, at 1206; Swack, supranote
64, at 368-69 (crediting Michelangelo as the first artist with enough clout to demand creative control
similar to artists' moral rights). And on the analogous development for writers, see MARK ROSE,
AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 16-20 (1993) [hereinafter ROSE, COPYRIGHT].
6 See Memorandum, 4 Burr. 2411, 2413-17, 98 Eng. Rep. 262, 264-266 (K.B. 1774) (providing a
brief history of printing in England); Donaldson v. Beckett, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 135, 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 840
(H.L.1774) ("In 1471, Caxton, a mercer of London, brought the art [of printing] into this kingdom.").
68For a traditional (and colorfully worded) history of English copyright law, see AUGUSTINE
BIRRELL, THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS (1899). For more recent versions, see inter
alia, LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968) (a more recently written
version); HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE (1956); ROSE, COPYRIGHT, supra note 68.
And for a comprehensive review of the relevant primary materials, critical of traditional accounts, see
ROMAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW
IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695-1775) (2004).
69See Memorandum, 4 Burr. at 2415, 98 Eng. Rep. at 265 (reporting on Caxton's secretive
acquisition of printing skills and their transmission to England); RANSOM, supra note 68, at 22
(reporting inducements for European printers to move to England); see also HarryHillman Chartrand,
Copyright C.P.U ."Creators, Proprietors,and Users,30 J.ARTS MGMT., L. & SOC'Y 209, 212 (2000) ("[T]he
year William Caxton introduced the printing press in England. ...a licensing law requir[ed] printers to
inscribe their name, location and titles of works they wanted to print on a register. If approved for
publication, the Crown granted a copye to the printer. The rights flowing from this copye... were held
by the printer.
) Proceedingsin the Lords on the Question ofLiteraryProperty(Feb.4-22, 1774), in
XVIII COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 950, 993-994 (1813) (De Grey, Lord C.J.)
[hereinafter COBBETT'S PARL. HIST.], http://www.copyrighthistory.com/donaldson.html (last visited Nov.
5, 2005) ("The manner in which the copy-right was held was a kind of copyhold tenure, in which the
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In the book printing and selling business, the monopoly came to vest in the
Stationers Company in London, the printers' guild.' 0 Only members of the Stationers
Company could print and sell books,71 and they were required to register each
publication with the Company.7 2 Without the means of production,7 3 authors usually
were forced to sell their manuscripts to members of the Company and forgo any direct
future benefits.7 4 The Stationers received the economic benefits of a monopoly,7 5 and the
76
government was able to control the market and exercise pre-publication censorship.
The Stationers also received some political protection because, by design, they were
prevented from publishing material that might displease the regime and thus endanger
themselves.7 7 By 1644, the poet John Milton was arguing publicly against the renewal of
pre-publication censorship laws.7 8 Milton advocated on behalf of both authors 79 and
1
societyj 0 and challenged the booksellers' motives.8
Although there was no explicit law at this time protecting moral rights (or economic
owner has a title by custom only, at the will and pleasure of the lord.").
70 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 2 n.4 (stating the "relationship between the state and the
Stationers began in 1557 when the Stationers' Company received its charter from Philip and Mary, for
the purpose of providing the monarchy with a method of controlling.., printing"); RANSOM, supranote
68, at 29 (stating Queen Mary chartered the Company as a means to regulate the press).
7' See VAIDHYANATHAN, sup-ra note 64, at 37 (calling this arrangement "a sweet deal for the
publishers").
72There were two main exceptions to this monopoly: (1) the royal prerogative, by which the
monarch directly controlled the printing of government documents, such as the laws and calendars, and
(2) the copyrights held by Oxford and Cambridge Universities. See BIRRELL, sup-ra note 68, at 55, 143.
73 See Chartrand, supranote 69, at 212 (explaining that booksellers owned a "capital-intensive and
technically demanding piece of equipment," there were many more authors than booksellers, and so
booksellers easily controlled the marketplace).
71Id. (reporting the norm was "a single up-front payment extinguishing all future economic and/or
moral claims of the [author] to the fruit of his or her efforts").
75 See BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 55 (describing "the printers or booksellers, who from the
beginning of things were alert to make a little money out of their calling"); Chartrand, supra note 69, at
216 (explaining "the stationers themselves steadfastly remained, what they had always been, eminently
practical men; and they consistently protected their monopoly"); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and "the
Exclusive RHiht"ofAuthors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 9 (1993) (stating "[t]he stationers ... insisted on a quid
pro quo"); RANSOM, supra note 68, at 10 (noting the Stationers Company's "shrewd service to official
regulation").
76 See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 213 (describing how the interests of the government and the
booksellers coincided); DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 2 (describing "a mutually beneficial association which
provided the monarch and the government of the day with an effective means to monitor and censor the
press, and the stationers with a statutory protection securing the reproduction of their copies."); Kwall,
'Author-Stories,"supra note 13, at 17 n.63 ("Licensing also facilitated government censorship."). The
relationship continued to develop via a series of Star Chamber decrees, Interregnum ordinances, and a
series of licensing acts. Soo DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 2 n.4; Chartrand, supra note 69, at 213-15;
RANSOM, supra note 68, at 33-36, 61-62, 66-73.
77 See BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 54 (reminding us that "to peddle new ideas in print has at all
periods of man's history exposed the pedler to pains and penalties of divers kinds").
78
JOHN MILTON, AEROPAGITICA, A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, To the
Parliamentof England (1644), roprintedin 32 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 381 (1952).
Milton himself flouted authority and published this speech as a pamphlet, without a license. Id. at vi.
7
' Id. at 398 (arguing that censorship was "a dishonour and derogation to the author").
80 Id. at 399 (arguing that censorship disparaged the intelligence of the public).
SI Id. at 412 (stating the booksellers acted "under pretence" and "with glosing colours" when
supporting the licensing acts).
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interests of authors, for that matter), in practice there was some protection for the
integrity and accurate attribution of literary works.8 2 If the censors had approved a
book, printing and selling a modified version of it would have had its risks. Once a
bookseller had the censors' approval and an exclusive license to print a book, he had good
reason to protect his investment and no economic incentive to incur further risk.8 3 Since
this system discouraged modifications, the integrity of the works received some
protection. If works were not modified, then authors' names would not be attached to
works which were not actually quite what they had written. Thus, licensing also would
have protected the aspect of the right of attribution that prevents an author's name from
84
being on work he did not create.
In addition to the effects of censorship and licensing, there may have been a type of
"honor among thieves." 5 If each guild member respected the other members' titles, his
own titles would be protected in turn. Misattribution or modification of a work would
thwart the registration system upon which the monopoly relied, because then something
other than the registered work8 6 would be competing in the marketplace. To the extent
this dynamic protected moral rights, the impetus was the protection of the economic
value of the works registered to guild members, not protection of authors' creativity.
Indeed, the general displeasure of authors with lack of control over their own
creations suggests that respect for moral rights within the guild was less than absolute.
The writer Daniel Defoe complained publicly about "press piracy" and the lack of respect
for authors' interests.87 The philosopher John Locke expressed his frustration with
booksellers who held copyrights in ancient works, stating they "claim the text to be
theirs, and so will not suffer fairer or more correct editions than any they print here, or
with new comments to be imported.
...
88 Preventing competing versions of books in
this context of censorship and absolute monopoly, with no works allowed into the public
domain, created stasis in the available texts, not necessarily a good result for authors'
creativity or incomes.
When the Licensing Act of 166289 expired in 1695, the convenient relationship
between the monarchy and the printers came to an end. 90 Locke had undertaken serious
82 See

VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 64, at 37 (stating that authors "could be assured that their

works would not be ...misrepresented in the market").
83 But see RANSOM, supra note 68, at 70-71 (indicating there were many unregistered publications
at this time).
84 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(1)(B) (2000) (granting an artist the right to prevent the use of his name on
a work he did not create); 17 U.S.C. § 106A(2) (granting an artist the right to prevent the use of his name
on a work "in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work").
85 See Chartrand, supranote 69, at 218 (referring to the "ethical"' practices of the guild concerning
moral rights).
86 See supranote 71.
87See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 31-32.
88John Locke, A Letter from Locke to Clarke, Oates, Jan. 2 (1692-93), reprinted in Hideaki
Shirata, The Ori4inof Two American Copyright Theories:A Case of the Reception ofEnglsh Law, 30 J.
ARTS MGMT., L., & SoCY 193, 206, App. A; see also DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 3-4.
89An Act for preventing the frequent Abuses in printing seditious, treasonable and unlicensed
Books and Pamphlets, and for regulating of Printing and Printing Presses (Licensing Act), 14 Car. 2, c.
33 (1662) (Eng.).
90
See DEAZLEY, supranote 68, at 1-2; Chartrand, supra note 69, at 216; RANSOM, supranote 68, at
89-90.
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advocacy behind the scenes 91 to help ensure the demise of licensing. As pre-publication
licensing of printed material ended, 92 the door was left open to develop new concepts of
9
this type of property and the rights to it.
3 The early alignment of aspects of moral rights
with the booksellers' interests, however, did not bode well for moral rights'
94
development.

B. The Statute ofAnne
In the common law countries, the Statute of Anne 95 receives credit as the earliest
statute of any kind protecting the rights of individual creators. 96 It is generally
considered the origin of modern Anglo-American copyright protection. 97 It gave authors
a property right, for a limited time period, in the work they created. 98 The author of a
book printed on April 10, 1710, who had not yet transferred the copyright, received
statutory copyright protection for twenty-one years. 99 For new works, the author
received statutory copyright protection for fourteen years. 100 An author who was still
91 See Shirata, supra note 88, at 195 (explaining "John Locke contributed much toward its repeal,

writing to peers in the House of Lords and strongly condemning.., the monopolies of the Stationers'
company"); DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 2-3, 9-10. The many ways in which John Locke's broader,
philosophical work influenced intellectual property concepts are beyond the scope of this article. See
generallyCarysJ. Craig, Locke, Labour andLimiting the Author'sRight:A WarningAgainsta Lockean
Approach to Copy±rghtLaw,28 QUEEN'S L.J. 1, 8-21 (2002) (reviewing Locke's fruits-of-labor theory and
its use underlying copyright law).
92 See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 216 ("Government control was henceforth limited to post
publication libel law.").
93See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 5.
94 See infra pp. 23, 26, 30-31.
9 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies (Statute of Anne), 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.),
http://www.copyrighthistory.com.
96See BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 19, 68 (referring to "the first copyright statute anywhere to be
found-the 8th of Good Queen Anne" and "the ...statute of Queen Anne, which ...has the honour of
being the first copyright statute at law to be found in the CorpusJurisof any State, either of the ancient
or modern times"); ROSE, COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, at 4 (referring to "the world's first copyright
statute").
97
See, e.g., Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 647 (1943) ("AngloAmerican copyright legislation begins in 1709 with the Statute of 8 Anne, c. 19."); RANSOM, supranote
68, at 106 (stating the statute "opened the period of modern copyright law").
98 8 Ann., c. 19, s.1.
99
1Id.
[F]rom and after the Tenth Day of Ap-ril, One thousand seven hundred and ten, the
Author of any Book or Books already Printed, who hath not Transferred to any other the
Copy or Copies of such Book or Books, Share or Shares thereof, or the Bookseller or
Booksellers, Printer or Printers, or other Person or Persons, who hath or have Purchased or
Acquired the Copy or Copies of any Book or Books, in order to Print or Reprint the same,
shall have the sole Right and Liberty of Printing such Book and Books for the Term of One
and twenty Years, to Commence from the said Tenth Day of April, and no longer.
Id.
100 -1d
[T]he Author of any Book or Books already Composed and not Printed and Published, or
that shall hereafter be Composed, and his Assignee, or Assigns, shall have the sole Liberty of
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alive after fourteen years received a second fourteen-year term of statutory copyright
protection. 101
10 2
The Statute of Anne applied only to creators of literature, i.e., writers.
Nonetheless, it is an important stepping stone in conceptualizing the rights and property
of these particular creators, 10 3 and hence the rights of all artists. 10 4 Instead of the earlier
monopolies that encouraged booksellers to disseminate already-written works, the
statute encouraged authors to create new works. 105 Its stated goal was "the
Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and Write useful Books." 10 6 The political
and legislative history of the statute shows continued efforts by the booksellers to hold
onto their lucrative monopolies. 10 7 Meanwhile, authors sought more than the small sum
they could earn from the initial sale of a manuscript to a bookseller. 0 8 Despite the
competition between the economic interests of authors and booksellers, it was actually
the higher aspiration to increase learning and knowledge that won the day in
Parliament. 109 At its inception, this first modern copyright statute concerned more than
the purely economic interests of the owners of particular property rights. "This element
of the public interest, overlooked or perhaps ignored in other historical tales of the origin
of copyright, once lay at its very core."" 0
Printing and Reprinting such Book and Books for the Term of fourteen Years, to Commence
from the Day of the First Publishing the same, and no longer.

Id.
101 Id. ("[A]fter the Expiration of the said Term of Fourteen Years, the sole Right of Printing or
Disposing of Copies shall return to the Authors thereof, if they are then Living, for another Term of
Fourteen Years.").
102
103

Id.
See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 218 (stating "itwas the first law to formally recognize a

[c]reator's rights.
101
In some countries today, intellectual property rights, both copyright and moral rights, are the
same for writers and artists in other media. See, e.g., Soc. Le Chant de Monde, Gaz. Pal. 1953, 2, pan.
jurispr., 191 (granting moral rights protection to classical music composer Shostakovich).
05
1
See Ginsburg, Authorsh/) inComparative Copyright,supranote 13, at 1064.
1068 Ann., c. 19, pmbl.
107 See DEAZLEY, supranote 68, at 32-50. The recent history of United States copyright law reveals
a similar dynamic. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Hitoricaland Philosophieal Underpinningsof the
Copyrikht Clause, 5 OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELL. PROP. 347 (from Cardozo School of Law (1999)
(suggesting the lobbying of particular industries creates copyright legislation, not "legislative
deliberation over the public good"); Kwall, 'Author-Stories," supra note 13, at 6-7 (calling for a
legislative approach more inclusive of artists' voices).
10See BIRRELL, supranote 68, at 197 ("Indifference to the money honestly produced by the sale of
books has never been a general characteristic of the British author, who for the most part has always
taken whatever he could get."). Butsee DEAZLEY, supranote 70, at 31-32 (asserting Daniel Defoe was
the first to argue for the rights of authors by suggesting a greater societal benefit).
109 See DEAZLEY, supranote 68, at 46 ("[The legislators] secured the continued production of useful
books through the striking of a culturally significant societal bargain, a trade-off involving, not the
bookseller and censorial state, but the author, the bookseller and the reading public."). Three hundred
years later, the exact same dynamic won the day for VARA. Robinson, supra note 16, at 1936 ("VARA
recognizes a public interest in the encouragement of artists to work ....Appealing to the public interest
...helped ensure the passage of the legislation by invoking a higher social good ...");
see also Cal. Civ.
Code § 987(a) (1982 & Supp. 2005) ("[T]here is also a public interest in preserving the integrity of
cultural and artistic creations.").
10 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 226; see also GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 28-29 (2002).
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A judiciary more attuned to this public interest element of intellectual property
protection might well be more adept at applying VARA to contemporary disputes,
because at its core VARA aims to protect societal interests1 11 in art by encouraging
11 3
artists to create, 11 2 just as the Statute of Anne aimed to encourage authors to write.
Yet after the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1709, the economic interests of individual
1 14
litigants took center stage in intellectual property law and seem to have never left.

C. The Engravers'Aet
In the middle part of the eighteenth century, the London booksellers were busy
running to the equity courts for injunctions against rival booksellers, 115 and authors of
literary works had a protective statute on the books that had not yet been interpreted by
the law courts.1 1 6 During this time period, the engravers, who created and printed
illustrations for books and for separate sale, lobbied for and received their own protective
statute.1 1 7 William Hogarth, a well-known artist in his time, is generally credited with
being savvy about the business side of his career, leading his fellow artists in the push
for legislation, anticipating lines of contrary arguments, and persuading his friends in
Parliament to pass the legislation.11 8 The Engravers' Act of 1735 was the first statute to
cover any works of visual art. 11 9 Using the basic conceptual framework of the Statute of
M See Ong, supranote 32, at 301-04 (analyzing different types of societal and authorial interests
addressed by moral rights).
' 12 See John Henry Merryman, The Pubhlie Interestin CulturalProperty,
77 CAL. L. REV. 339, 34555 (1989) [hereinafter Merryman, Public Interest] (explaining that people value cultural property for
aesthetic, political, religious, and utilitarian reasons); John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of
BernardBuffet,27 HASTINGS L. J. 1023, 1041 (1976) ("We are interested in protecting the work of art for
public reasons, and the moral right of the artist is in part a method of providing for private enforcement
of this public interest."); 133 CONG. REC. S11, 502 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
("In our country, as in every other country and civilization, artists are the recorders, and preservers of
the national spirit. The creative arts are an expression of the character of the Nation-they mirror its
accomplishments, warn of its failings, and anticipate its future.").
11 8 Ann., c. 19, pmbl.
114 The shift in focus in our intellectual property law was so complete for so long that almost three
hundred years later, when VARA was passed, it was characterized as "one of the most extraordinary
realignments of private property rights ever adopted by Congress." JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT
E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 283-84 (3d ed. 1998).
1'5See infra pp. 20-21.
116 8 Ann., c. 19.
117 An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of designing, engraving and etching historical and
other Prints, by vesting the Properties thereof in the Inventors and engravers, during the Time therein
mentioned (Engravers' Act), 8 Geo. 2, c. 13 (1735) (Eng.).
13 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 88-94 (providing a detailed legislative history); Mark Rose,
Technology and Copyright in 1735: The Engravers'Act,21 THE INFO. Soc'Y 63, 64 (2005) [hereinafter
Rose, Engravers] (referring to Hogarth as "the force behind the bill," as well as its primary beneficiary);
SIMON STOKES, ART AND COPYRIGHT 23 (2003) (referring to Hogarth as "the force behind the Act");
JENNIFER S. UGLOW, HOGARTH: A LIFE AND A WORLD 268-71 (1997) (describing Hogarth's legislative
involvement, in a popular bibliography).
11) See Rose, Engravers, supranote 118, at 63 (referring to "the world's second piece of copyright
legislation"); STOKES, supranote 118, at 23 (referring to "the first statute to give legislative protection to
artistic works").
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Anne, 120 the Engravers' Act gave "every person who shall invent and design, engrave,
etch, or work in Mezzotinto or Chiaro Oscuro" a fourteen-year monopoly in printing that
work. 121 The Engravers' Act brought intellectual property status and protection to non122
text printed works, and it was successful in decreasing the number of pirated copies.
124
123
The act was amended in 1767, to be "more effectual," and again a year later.
Although the Engravers' Act did not directly label anything "moral rights" as we
know the term today, it showed a much greater understanding of the creative process
than the Statute of Anne had. 125 The preamble began by stating: "divers persons have
by their own genius, industry, pains, and expence, invented and engraved, or worked in
Mezzotinto, or Chiaro Oscuro ..... 126 The words "genius" and "invented" acknowledged
the creative spark of the artist and the mental work involved. Words like "industry,"
"pains," "engraved," and "worked in" spoke more of the manual work involved and
described the process of creating a print. Where the Statute of Anne referred only to the
authors of a finished product, a book,127 the preamble of the Engravers' Act referred to
people who had exercised industry, taken pains, and worked in a particular medium,
emphasizing the process they had undertaken.1 28 Putting this acknowledgment in the
preamble showed that protecting this process was the whole point of the statute.
Lest any contemporary doubt that purpose, the preamble continued: "print-sellers
and other persons have of late, without the consent of the inventors, designers, and
proprietors of such prints, frequently taken the liberty of copying, engraving, and
publishing.., base copies of such works.., to the very great prejudice.., of the
inventors, designers, and proprietors thereof."129 The concern for "base" copies, i.e., poor
quality copies, that were made "to the very great prejudice" of the original artists was
very similar to the current concern for the right of attribution and the right of integrity
protected by today's moral rights laws. For example, VARA gives a visual artist "the
right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the
event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation."' 13 0 Prejudice to the artist, caused by
distorting the original work, is a harm protected against by both the Engravers' Act and
Soo DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 92.
8 Geo. 2, c. 13, s. 1.
122 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 89, 91-92 (contrasting the amount of pirating of specific works

120

121

by engraver
William Hogarth before and after passage of the statute).
123
An Act to amend and render more effectual an Act made in the eighth Year of the reign of King
George the Second, for Encouragement of the Arts of Designing, Engraving and Etching, Historical and
other Prints; and for the vesting in, and securing to Jane Hogarth, Widow, the Property in certain
Prints, 6 Geo. 3, c. 38 (1767) (Eng.); see also Rose, Engravers; supra note 118, at 65 (describing the
addition of protection for engravers who used designs originally created by other painters and printers);
STOKES, supra note 118, at 24 (describing extension of copyright protection to those who engraved
others' designs).
124 17 Geo. 3, c. 57 (1777) (Eng.); see alsoRose, Engravers; supranote 118, at 65 (describing a new
requirement to seek permission before using another's design).
12 See Rose, Engravears supra note 118, at 63 (calling the differences in the acts "instructive").
126

127
128

8 Geo. 2, c. 13, pmbl.
8 Ann., c. 19, s. 1.
8 Geo.2, c. 13, pmbl.

12 d.
130G17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (2000).
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VARA.
The Engravers' Act preamble also included references to the economic concerns of
the engravers, and these economic references were comfortably intertwined with the
references to the creative process. The preamble stated that the engravers had created
their works "in hopes to have reaped the sole benefit of their labours," 13 1 and that the
poor quality copies were made to their "detriment."' 13 2 This language suggested that
more than just artistic reputations were at stake. In context, the engravers' desire to
"reap the sole benefit" would have meant the economic benefit. Because the "detriment"
caused by poor quality rip-offs was listed separately from the "prejudice" they caused, it
likely meant detriment to the engravers' incomes. Indeed, there is evidence133 that
Hogarth really was highly agitated by poor quality copies that distorted his creations and
sold for less than his prints, 134 harming both his reputation and his income.
Including the economic and creative concerns together in the preamble showed that
at this early stage of development, the English intellectual property law easily
accommodated both sets of interests. One long-winded, eighteenth-century preamble
could address aspects of both copyright and moral rights. Back in 1735, the possibility
existed for this preamble to become a precursor of later Anglo-American arts legislation.
In addition, the text of the statute gave the print engravers protection against
copying "in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to or diminishing from the main
Design."13 5 At that time, many disputes between booksellers and authors centered on
whether an abridged or annotated version of a book violated copyright, 136 because the
Statute of Anne only referred to a "book, '"137 i.e., the whole entity. The engravers had
this matter settled in their statute. Printing a version of an illustration that had
something changed, taken away or added to it, without permission, would have violated
the statute. Given the limited technology of the time, this limited prohibition against
publishing modified prints probably did cover all potential modification abuses, at least
within the same medium.
Protecting against this type of copying in particular showed a greater understanding
of the creative process than the protection afforded books at that time. For example,
1 38
Hogarth often created engravings of busy scenes, with famous people in caricature.
The statute prohibited printing a copy of only part of a print, a copy "diminishing from
the main design."1 39 After passage of the statute, a rival could not choose one figure from
Hogarth's scene and copy it in a new print. The statute also prohibited "adding to ... the

131 8 Geo. 2, c. 13, pmbl.
132 Id.
133

Hogarth et al., The Case of Designers, Engravers, Etchers, Stated In a Letter to a Member of
Parliament (1735) [hereinafter EngvraversLotteA , reprintedinRose, Engravers, supra note 120, at 66
n.4; DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 89.
134 See Rose, EngTavers, supra note 118, at 64 (describing the printsellers' practice of making cheap
copies for high volume sales).
135 8 Geo.2, c. 13, s. 1.
6 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 79-85 (exploring the relationship between the Statute of Anne
and "the altered text").
137 8 Ann., c. 19, s. 1.
138 See UGLOW, supra note 118, at 268.
'398 Geo. 2, c. 13, s. 1.
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main design," 140 i.e., printing a copy to which new images had been added. Hogarth's
rival, for example, could not copy the busy scene, add a caricature of the king to the
scene, and engrave it as a new print.
141
Finally, the statute prohibited printing a copy "varying... the main design,"
varying the original in some way. Presumably, this "varying" was something other than
"adding to" or "diminishing from" the original design. The items in the short list of
prohibited activities are separated by commas and the disjunctive "or,"142 suggesting
each item was a different prohibited activity. If so, following the same example, a rival
could not copy Hogarth's scene, distort the proportions of the figures or change where
they were located in the scene, and print the result.
The Engravers' Act, then, implicitly acknowledged the uniqueness of the parts of the
whole in a work of visual art, as well as the uniqueness of their arrangement or
relationship to each other. These are aspects of visual art we now call "design elements"
and "composition." These aspects of design are inherent in the creative process and the
resulting work. Recognizing and respecting the creative process in this way was a huge
leap forward in the development of intellectual property law, yet, for the most part, it has
been overlooked. 143 In addition, the insightful language of this early statute was no
accident. Hogarth, the prime impetus for the legislation, 144 understood well every aspect
of being an artist. He preferred to handle every step himself, both in terms of his art and
145
his business.
Granting these visual artists, the engravers, some control over the publication of
modified versions of their work gave them much the same type of control now provided
for by the right of integrity. 146 "[V]arying, adding to or diminishing from the main

design" 147 would certainly fall under the "intentional distortion ... or other modification"
now prohibited by VARA.148

Viewed from another angle, this statutory provision also appears to be the first to
protect against unauthorized creation of some types of derivative works, a protection that
has continued and expanded in the law over the centuries and exists in a broader form
today.149 A "derivative work," as the term implies, is a new work derived from a
previously existing one. Reprinting just one or just a few design elements from a larger

]/]IId.

142 Id.

143 See DEAZLEY, supranote 68, at 94 (suggesting a "silent revolution" took place with passage of
the Engravers' Act).
M See supranote 120 and accompanying text.
145See Rose, Engravers; supranote 118, at 64 (explaining that for many of his most famous works,
Hogarth was the "inventor, painter, engraver, and publisher," which was not common practice at that
time); Stokes, supra note 118, at 23-24 (attributing the Act's coverage of original designs to the fact
Hogarth was both designer and engraver of his works).
146 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(a) (2000).
147 8 Geo. 2, c. 13, s. 1.
118
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(a).
19 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("A derivative work is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a[n] . . .abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations or other
modifications ....
is a derivative work."); 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (granting the copyright owner the exclusive
right to prepare derivative works).
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work would be creating a derivative work. Likewise, adding one or more design elements
to an existing work to create a new work would also create a derivative work. The
Engravers' Act protected against these types of unauthorized derivative works, by
prohibiting copying "by varying, adding to, or diminishing from" the original design.
Again, protection from this type of copying showed a greater understanding of the
creative process, with its implication that creating the elements of a design and the
composition of the design were integral parts of how visual artists worked and worth
protecting. Again, given the technology of the time, the enumerated types of derivative
works likely covered all the possible ways to create derivative works within the medium.
Analyzing this first statutory protection for visual art shows the close relationship
between moral rights' protection of the integrity of a work and copyright's protection
against unauthorized derivative works. Often, modifying a work of visual or performing
art will create a derivative work. Thus, an unauthorized process (protected against by
the artist's right of integrity in the work) may lead to an unauthorized result (protected
against by the copyright owner's exclusive right in derivative works). Future
refinements to the language of the Engravers' Act and more experience with it might
conceivably have lead the law in the direction of either our current moral rights provision
or our current copyright provision, i.e., either towards the right of integrity or the
exclusive right to create derivative works-or both. In the days of proto intellectual
property law, the possibility remained for the evolutionary tree to develop either or both
branches. At that moment in time, the door still remained open for the development of
moral rights concepts in the Anglo-American law.
Of course, it is striking (no pun intended) that the Engravers' Act actually contained
the word "design." 15 0 This inclusion was no accident, as evidenced by the legislative
history of the Act. 151 The laments of the engravers 152 were not unlike the previouslyheard grievances of literary artists, 153 but the language relevant to the engravers' artistic
complaints survived a much speedier 154 and less contentious legislative process.
The statute also made clear that anyone who bought original engraving plates from
an engraver was purchasing both the plates and the right to reprint more copies using
the plates. 155 In this way, the Engravers' Act provided a clearer delineation than the
Statute of Anne did between owning the physical object itself and having the right to
make copies, the copyright.156
This delineation has remained in the law to the present day.15 7 Although moral
rights were not involved in this particular distinction, this first-ever statute concerning
1508 Geo. 2, c. 13, s. 1.
151See Rose, Engravers, supranote 118, at 65 (suggesting in 1735 the word "design" still carried
connotations from the Italian Renaissance word "disegno," which distinguished between artists and
craftsmen, i.e., between intellectual work and manual work).
152 See id. at 64-65; DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 88-91.
153 See MILTON, supranote 78; Locke, supranote 88; DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 31-32 (discussing
Defoe's complaints).
154 See RANSOM, supra note 68, at 6-7 (summarizing the Statute of Anne as "the consummation of
more than two hundred years of slow changes").
155 8 Geo. 2, c. 13, s. 2.
1)c See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 93 ("[H]ere the legislature tried to account for, and give
recognition to, the convergence of two types of property in the one form.").
157 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000) ("Ownership of a copyright.., is distinct from ownership of any material
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visual art made it clear that there were separate tangible and intangible property rights
in the engravers' work. Once this concept was accepted, the possibility at least was
opened for other intangible rights to develop 158 and for those rights to remain separate
from ownership of the physical object. Moral rights, of course, are intangible rights held
by the artist, 159 no matter who owns the physical object, 160 so this broader conceptual
clarification of separate tangible and intangible rights in art seems another useful
161
precursor to moral rights' development.
Thus, just as specific modern concepts for Anglo-American intellectual property law
were starting to take shape, the Engravers' Act accounted for some of the realities of the
creative process, showing that economic and non-economic concerns swam in the same
primordial soup of intellectual property law ideas. It may simply have been an historical
accident that there were savvy artists among the engravers and that engraving was the
artistic field most closely related to writing literature, which already had statutory
protection. If so, it is an accident that began the gradual extension of legal protection
from literature to the other arts. 162 Unfortunately, thanks to another fluke of history,
that protection eventually was limited to economic interests, as moral rights were lopped
off the family tree.

object in which the work is embodied.").
158The engravers also gave early articulation to the idea-expression dichotomy, as they anticipated
and fully addressed concerns about two artists depicting the same subject. See DEAZLEY, supranote 68,
at 91 (exploring how the engravers reassured Parliament that each artist's way of depicting a common
subject would be as unique as his handwriting, so all subject matter would remain free to depict); Rose,
Eng-ravers supranote 118, at 65 ("Everyone has undoubtedly an equal Right to every Subject, and...
without directly copying the Design of the other, equally makes use of his own Skill .... ") (quoting
Engravers Letter, supra note 133). On the idea-expression dichotomy, see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(2000) ("In no case does copyright protection.., extend to any idea .... regardless of the form in which it
is... embodied...."); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1880) (finding copyright protects a written
statement, not its subject matter); Lisa Michelle Weinstein, Ancient Works, Modern Dilemmas: The
Dead Sea Scroll Copyright Case, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 1637, 1662-65 (1994) (explaining various aspects of
the idea-expression dichotomy).
159 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) ("Only the author of a work ... has the rights" of attribution and
integrity.).
160 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2) ("Ownership of the rights [of attribution and integrity] ... is
distinct from ownership of any copy of that work, or of a copyright ... in that work.").
161 Although moral rights generally are referred to as intellectual property rights, they are really
only quasi-property rights, more like rights arising from the creation of property that are personal rights
of the artist. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1824 (1996) ("The rights spring from a belief that an artist in the process of creation injects his spirit into
the work and that the artist's personality ... should therefore be protected ..
"); Linda J. Lacey, Of
Broadand Roses and Copyrikhts, 1989 DUKE. L.J. 1532, 1541-42 (explaining the personality aspect of
art acknowledged by Hegel and Kant); Liemer, Primerc supra note 26, at 43 (analyzing artists'
vulnerability to a unique, personal harm); Swack, supranote 64, at 370-71 (tracing the philosophical
underpinnings of artists' rights as rights of personality).
1GBy 1842, copyright protection for writers, engravers, and other categories of visual and
performing artists were merged in the British copyright law. Copyright Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45
(Eng.). In the United States, copyright protection was extended to different types of creative work as
the years proceeded. See, e.g., Okediji, supra note 43, at 1647-49 (reviewing nineteenth-century and
early twentieth-century judicial and legislative extensions of copyright to cover new technologies and
additional types of creative works).
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D. Early Copyright Cases
The earliest English copyright cases under the Statute of Anne 163 were Court of
Chancery cases, where the judges sat in equity and the plaintiffs applied for injunctive
relief. 164 In many of these cases, after a complaint was filed, the defendants did not file
answers and simply curtailed their behavior. 165 When injunctions were granted, the
166
defendants generally did not pursue matters further.
Pressing ahead on a case to try the underlying substantive law issues would have
required bringing a new case in a court of law (as opposed to the Chancellor's court of
equity), taking up more time and money. Defendants in early English copyright disputes
interpreted the Court of Chancery's decisions as an indicator of the likely outcome in law
courts 167 and decided it was not worth the extra time and expense to pursue the legal
issues.1 68 In addition, plaintiffs historically sought relief in a court of equity when they
saw no real remedy for their problem at law.1 69 In the half century following the passage
of the Statute of Anne, this would have been an accurate read of the situation. There
was no easily-discernible, helpful remedy in a law court for alleged copyright
infringement, in part due to ambiguities in the statute1 70 and in part due to a lack of
precedents to guide potential litigants. It was generally assumed that trying to calculate

163

8 Ann., c. 19.

161See BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 101 (noting the booksellers' sudden affinity for the Court of
Chancery); DEAZLEY, supranote 68, at 51 ("In the three decades following the passing of the Statute of

Anne those litigants seeking to rely upon the statute to protect their property did so before the Court of
Chancery."); see a]soDonaldson v. Beckett, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 138, 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 842 (H.L. 1774) (listing
some of the more well-known, at the time, of these Chancery Court cases, along with names of the
authors and disputed works); Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2325-31, 2352-54, 2378-80, 98 Eng. Rep.
201, 213-16, 228, 241-42 (K.B. 1769) (reviewing many of the earlier injunction cases); COBBETT'S PARL.
HIST., supra note 69, at 989 (De Grey, Lord C.J.) ("The causes which have come before the court of
Chancery since the statute, I find to be 17 in number.").
5

16 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 51.
-,See
id.at 57-85.

1

1 7

; Butsee COBBETT'S PARL. HIST., supranote 69, at 996 (reporting Lord Camden's 1774 statement

in the House of Lords that over the years the Chancellors, including himself, only issued the injunctions
to avoid irreparable harm while a legal issue remained in dispute).
168 "Few bills against pirates of books are ever brought to a hearing. If the defendant acquiesces
under the injunction, it is seldom worth the plaintiffs while to proceed for an account; the sale of the
edition being stopped." Millar,4 Burr. at 2324, 98 Eng. Rep. at 213 (Willes, J).
169See Hon. H. Brent McKnight, HowShall We Then Reason? The HistoricalSettingofEquity,45
MERCER L. REV. 919, 930 (1994) (explaining a root cause of this course of relief was the Chancellor's
ability to slightly vary the available writs, as early as the thirteenth century, when only Parliament
could create a new writ); David W. Raack, A History ofInjunctions in Eng]andBefore1700, 61 IND. L.J.
539, 556-57 (1986) (describing injunctions sought from the Chancellor when no remedy existed at
common law, as early as the fourteenth century).
170 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 61-62, 164 ("It was and remains a poorly drafted piece of
legislation."); BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 68 (describing "the unfortunately conceived and unhappily
expressed statute").
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damages under the Statute of Anne would be a difficult, potentially futile exercise. 171
Also, plaintiffs likely perceived a law suit to be risky because the statute allowed a
defendant to "plead the general issue," 172 "give the special matter in evidence,"1 73 and
recover costs if successful.1 74 In addition, there was a major legal issue for which there
was no definitive answer: whether a common law copyright ever existed pre-dating the
statute, and, if so, whether it reverted back into effect once the statutory time period had
run. 175
Thus, for half a century after passage of the Statute of Anne, the cases show efforts
by booksellers to quickly and inexpensively prevent others from encroaching on their
already-established, profitable monopolies. 176 "The encouragement of learned men to
compose and write useful books"177 for the greater social good, on which passage of the
statute had depended, was not the litigants' focus. While at first glance it may seem
curious that authors did not rush to the law courts to assert their new-found rights, this
dynamic is not unlike the reluctance of artists today to assert their new-found rights
under VARA.178 In addition, authors still did not control the means of production and
had limited clout in the market place.

E. Millar v. Taylor
Finally, in 1769, the English Court of King's Bench considered the copyright case of
Miflar v. Taylor,179 applying the Statute of Anne1s8 head on for the first time.181 Millarv.
Taylor concerned the rights of an author, as previously, in the lay sense of the word
"author," a writer of literature.18 2 One of the attorneys who argued skillfully for the

171See Millar, 4 Burr. at 2318, 98 Eng. Rep. at 209 (Willes, J.) ("For, by common law, a bookseller
can recover no more costs than he can prove damage : but it is impossible for him to prove the truth... ;
because a thousand counterfeit copies may be dispersed into as many different hands all over the
kingdom, and he not be able to prove the sale of ten."); RANSOM, supra note 68, at 105 (stating the
"penalties were judged not to be worth the expense or risks of a trial at common law").
172 8 Ann., c. 19, s. 8.
173 _[d

171-d.; see also RANSOM, supra note 68, at 103-04.
175 One case did bring this issue squarely before a court of law, but when the judges learned the
parties on both sides had a friendly agreement to just get the issue settled and no real dispute with each
other, the court refused to issue a decision based on their collusion. Tonson v. Collins, 1 Black. W. 301,
96 Eng. Rep. 169 (K.B. 1761); Tonson v. Collins, 1 Black. W. 329, 98 Eng. Rep. 181 (K.B. 1762); so also
BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 109-10; VAIDHYANATHAN, sup-ra note 64, at 42.
17
6 See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 62 ("[T]here can be no doubt that the route through Chancery
was perceived to be considerably more expedient than following an infringer at common law.").
1778 Ann., c. 19, pmbl.
178 See supranotes 36-39 and accompanying text.
17 9
Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
180 8 Ann., c. 19.
181M/r,
4 Burr. at 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. at 201 ("This case was a revival of the old and oftenlitigated question concerning literary property: and it was the first determination which the question
ever received, in this Court of King's Bench.").
182 Cf 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (defining a "work of authorship" as: "(1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures
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plaintiff was William Blackstone,18 3 and this was exactly the time period when the four
volumes of Blackstone's Commentaries184 were being carried around the colonies in the
saddle bags of American lawyers.1 8 5 In 1769 the American colonies had not yet declared
their independence, and an English case like Millar would have been considered
applicable precedent in the colonies. Because of trade disruptions during the American
Revolution, Mi]arwasthe last English copyright decision American lawyers and jurists
had access to until the war was over.18 6 And so, what the justices in Millarhad to say
about the rights of literary creators sheds some light on what could have happened later
in England and the United States, but did not.
MZllarwas a dispute about a book called The Seasons,written by James Thomson.187
The author published the book in London from 1727 to 1729.188 The jury found that
Andrew Millar purchased the book in 1729, "for a valuable and full consideration ... to
him and his heirs and assigns for ever," 18 9 and both Millar and the jury seem to have
assumed the "common law copyright" was part of the deal.1 90 Millar registered the book
in the registry of the Company of Stationers, the method at that time by which London
printers and booksellers still gave notice of their copyright in a book.19 1 The author,
Thomson, died in 1748. Then in 1763, Robert Taylor began publishing and selling copies
of the book. 192 Since the Statute of Anne only provided copyright protection for a
maximum of twenty-eight years, 193 Millar's statutory copyright protection, which started
in 1729 when he purchased the book from the author, would have run out by 1763,
thirty-four years later.
The main questions before the Court were whether any common law copyright
existed before the passage of the statute, whether the statute pre-empted and totally
extinguished any such common law copyright, or whether a common law copyright preexisting the statute remained after the statutory copyright term.1 94 The lawyers for each
and other
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.").
183
Milar,4 Burr. at 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. at 201 (listing "the second [argument], by Mr. Blackstone,
for the plaintiff').
184SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-1769). Blackstone
covers copyright in his Commentaries.

SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF

ENGLAND, 9th ed., 405-07 (1783) (updated edition incorporating Mlarand later Donaldsondecisions)
(facsimile ed. 1978).
185 See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Marshall'sJudicialRhetoric,1996 SUP. CT. REV. 439,
443 (explaining the importance to the growth of American law of the Commentaries being both wellorganized and compact enough to fit in saddle bags).
'86 Between 1773 and 1783 the United States was at war with Great Britain and there
was no tradebetween the two B including in law books and legal decisions.
Accordingly, the last major copyright decision of the British courts current in legal
circles of what was becoming the United States was Millar v. Taylor.
Chartrand, supra note 69, at 223.
187 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2305-06, 98 Eng. Rep. at 203.
188 Id. at 2306, 98 Eng. Rep. at 203.
189 Jd,
190ld.
19' Id.

192

193

fd.

at 2308, 98 Eng. Rep. at 204.

See supranotes 100, 101 and accompanying text.

191The justices did not word the issues exactly the same way. For example, Justice Willes listed
two issues, Millar, 4 Burr. at 2311, 98 Eng. Rep. at 206, while Justice Aston listed three issues id., at
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side of course presented the arguments they believed best aided their clients' interests; 195
they were not necessarily crafting lofty pronouncements for the sake of posterity. For
the individual litigants, the question of whether there was any remaining copyright to be
claimed doubtless was a simple economic question: whoever owned the copyright would
derive economic benefit from it. The author himself was dead, and his heirs were not
parties in the case.
The plaintiff was simply a bookseller who wanted to maintain his monopoly, as the
booksellers had always done. He had purchased the book from the author, and he would
have argued for the common law copyright and reversion to it once the statutory time
period had run. The defendant wanted to sell the book now that the statutory time
period for copyright had run, so he would have argued that the statute totally
extinguished any previous copyright, i.e., no copyright at all remained after twenty-eight
years. The defendant, a competing bookseller, ended up taking the side of the argument
previously belonging to authors and the reading public, the side the Statute of Anne was
supposed to protect. And so the defendant had the statutory argument to make, while
the plaintiff had the common law argument.
While deciding this issue, the justices' analyses flowed in many directions. They
drew on a wide variety of sources 196 including common law, 197 John Locke's natural law
ideas,198 related civil law concepts, 199 and moral concerns. 200 They described and
interpreted what was, in effect, the legislative history of the Statute of Anne. 20 1 They
analyzed whether there was any common law copyright to begin with, and, if so, what it
protected. 202 During this analysis they went back to basics, examining what "property"
204
was 203 and what it meant to have a right in property.
2336, 98 Eng. Rep. at 219.
195 Blackstone himself made money by assigning to booksellers the copyright in his Commentaries,
BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 131 n.1, so he likely had a personal interest in the outcome of the case, too.
As a very prominent author, Blackstone actually could make more money selling perpetual copyrights in
the different editions of his work than he could make selling limited, twenty-eight year copyrights, so it
is not surprising he argued on the side of the plaintiff, for the common law copyright.
196 See, e.g., Millar, 4 Burr. at 2354, 98 Eng. Rep. at 228 (Aston, J.) (basing his conclusions "upon
every principle of reason, natural justice, morality and common law").
197 See, e.g., id. at 2343, 98 Eng. Rep. at 223 (Aston, J.) (citing DODDRIDGE, THE ENGLISH LAWYER
154-61 (1631) (stating the common law "is founded on the law of nature and reason" and "derived from
... natural and moral philosophy, from the civil and canon law, from logic, from the use, custom and
conversation among men")).
198 See, e.g., id. at 207 (Willes, J.) (referring to Milton's 1644 speech supporting copyright and
asserting "this copyright could, at that time, stand upon no other foundation, than naturaljusticeand
common law") (emphasis added); id. at 2355, 98 Eng. Rep. at 229 (Yates, J.) (asserting English personal
property law "had its grand foundation in natural law"); see also Craig, supra note 91, at 8-21.
199 So Mlar, 4 Burr. at 2344, 98 Eng. Rep. at 223 (Aston, J.) (drawing from "the civil and canon
law," and quoting Justinian); see generallyEdwardD. Re, The Roman Contributionto the Common Law,
29 FORDHAM L. REV. 447 (1960-61); see also infra pp. 25-26.
200
Millar,4 Burr. at 2342, 98 Eng. Rep. at 222 (Aston, J.) (referring to "moral rectitude" and "[t]he
law of nature and truth, and the light of reason"); id. at 2399, 98 Eng. Rep. at 253 (Lord Mansfield, C.J.)
(referring to "moral justice and fitness").
201 See id. at 2317, 2332-33, 98 Eng. Rep. at 209, 217.
202 See, e.g., id. at 2341-42, 2358-66, 98 Eng. Rep. at 221-22, 230-35.
203
See, e.g., id. at 2338-40, 2355-57, 98 Eng. Rep. 220-21, 229-30.
204 Many law students in the United States start their first-year property law course by reading
Pierson v. Post,3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), the case discussing whether a hunter
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The modern sense of rights in intellectual property were still very much in
development, and concepts now found separated in copyright law's protection of economic
interests and moral rights' protection of creative interests often sit side-by-side in the
Millar justices' analysis, sometimes in the same sentence. 20 5 For example, in Justice
Aston's final sentence of his opinion, words sit side-by-side that point to the economic
interests of copyright and the creative interests of moral rights: "And I hope the learned
and industrious will be permitted from henceforth, not only to reap the fame, but the
profits of their ingenious labours, without interruption; to the honour and advantage of
themselves and their families." 20 6 Protecting both "fame" and "profits" were easily
coordinated legal goals in this eighteenth-century English jurist's mind; so was
protecting both "honour" and "advantage." His understanding of the nature of
intellectual property expanded to include and value all these concepts. Today, while
"fame" and "honor" are values VARA recognizes, 207 "profits" and "advantage" belong
20 8
squarely to the traditional economic focus of copyright law.
In the lone dissent, Justice Yates focused on the intangible, incorporeal nature of
the property that the rights would attach to, and he homed in on something that still
seems to be a sticky point in the law: 20 9 "[T]he fallacy lies in the equivocal use of the
word 'property;' which sometimes denotes the right of the person; ... sometimes, the
object itself. Here, the question is upon the object itself, not the person." 210 He likely
was pointing to the difference between owning the book and owning the copyright,
extending the distinction between tangible and intangible rights in intellectual property
that the Engravers' Act had first clarified. 211 Because these judges did not strictly
distinguish aspects of copyright from moral rights, it is possible "the right of person"
referred to rights we would now separate into the two categories. Justice Yates did

pursuing a wild fox can have a property right in it. Piersonwas decided in New York only twenty-five
years after Mil!ar,and readers will see similar modes of analysis and expressions in the two cases.
205 The flowery language and complex syntax of eighteenth-century jurists do not always make for
quick reading. Any proponents of plain English in the law who feel pessimistic about their success need
only read a page of eighteenth-century English legal prose to realize what a long way the plain English
movement has come.
20 6
Millar, 4 Burr. at 2354, 98 Eng. Rep. at 229.
20
7VARA gives a visual artist "the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the
work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would
be prejudicial to his or her honororreputation,"17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added), and the
right "to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation," 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
208
See Jimmy A. Frazier, On MoralRights, Artist-CenteredLegislation,and the Role of the State
in Art Worlds: Notes on Building a Sociology of Copyright Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 313, 317 (1995)
(criticizing the focus on economic rights of United States copyright law and copyright scholars and
offering a sociologically-based alternative).
20) See generallyRichard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Craeks in the Foundations of
CopyrightLaw, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005); Adam Mossoff, Is CopyrightProperty?42 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 29 (2005).
2 0
1 Millar,4 Burr. at 2362, 98 Eng. Rep. at 233; see alsoKwall, 'Author-Stoies,"supra note 13, at
16 ("History shows that delineating the exact nature of the author's interest always has been
problematic .... [W]orks of authorship are like other forms of property in that they have the potential
for commodification, but they differ from more tangible types of property ... because they also entail
important personal interests.").
211 See supna p. 18-19.
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acknowledge a "moral obligation" behind basic property law concepts, 212 but he refused to
extend it to intellectual property absent specific statutory protection. 213 His dissent is
important, because it previews the law's future evolution.
Lord Mansfield, voting with the majority, had the final word. His opinion went the
furthest towards the concepts now protected as moral rights. First, he hinted at the
right of attribution: "It is just, that another should not use [an author's] ... name,
without his consent." 214 And then, Lord Mansfield described well some of the harms that
moral rights protect against:
He is no more master of the use of his own name. He has no control over the
correctness of his own work. He can not prevent additions. He can not retract
errors. He can not amend; or cancel a faulty edition. Any one may print,
pirate, and perpetuate the imperfections, the disgrace and against the will of
the author; may propagate sentiments under his name, which he disapproves,
2
repents and is ashamed of. 15
What Lord Mansfield described was essentially a lack of the rights of attribution,216
2 19
integrity, 217 and disclosure, 218 and its effect on the honor and reputation of a writer.
He described these harms in the context of his reasoning in favor of the perpetual
common law copyright, on the side of the monopolistic booksellers, because he felt if the
statute put an end to all copyright after twenty-eight years, authors would suffer the
220
enumerated harms.
Many lawyers in the United States learned in school that Blackstone's
Commentariesbrought the common law to the American colonies and early states, 221 and
so he was a champion of the common law, yet Blackstone and his contemporaries in
English legal circles knew and were influenced by civil law. 222 Although the law of
ancient Rome, did not address intellectual property per se, 223 it did recognize
plagiarism.

224

This concept of literary theft was an early kernel, from which the Roman

212 Millar, 4 Burr. at 2365, 98 Eng. Rep. at 235.

Id. at 2395, 98 Eng. Rep. at 250.
Id. at 2398, 98 Eng. Rep. at 252; cord, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1).
21MiiIar,4 Burr. at 2398, 98 Eng. Rep. at 252. As one scholar points out, however, Lord
Mansfield's articulation of authors' personal rights was never actually applied to any future case.
Swack, supra note 64, at 381.
216 See suprap. 4.
217 See sup-ra p. 4-5.
218 See suprap. 8, n.54.
219
See suprapp. 4-5 and accompanying footnotes.
22
0Millr, 4 Burr. at 2399, 98 Eng. Rep. 253.
213
2

14

22 1-4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES; see STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN,
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 295 (5th ed. 2003) (asserting only the Bible had more
influence on the history of American institutions).
222
See Re, supra note 199, at 452 (stating "Sir William Blackstone, in his opening Vinerian lecture
at Oxford, on the 25th of October, 1758, commended the study of civil law.").
22: See RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT AND ITS HISTORY 8 (1912) (identifying a few brief
mentions of literary property in ancient Rome). For a comprehensive review of the law of ancient Rome,
see RUSS VERSTEEG, LAW IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 269-367 (2002).
221 See RANSOM, supra note 68, at 19 n.4 (citing studies about literary property in ancient Rome);
Swack, supranote 64, at 366-67 (analyzing concepts of authors' relationship to their work in ancient
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law's progeny, the civil law of Europe, 225 began developing intellectual property concepts,
as the need arose. 226 Indeed, moral rights concepts developed in the civil law shortly
after this time period, in the early nineteenth century.227 So the justices in Millar drew
from a primordial soup of legal ideas that included, in part, ideas that several decades
later would develop into artists' moral rights in France. 228 The familiarity with civil law
concepts that many eighteenth-century English lawyers and jurists shared 229 may
explain some of the ease with which they bandied back and forth concepts that today
seem more rigidly embedded in either the civil law or the common law intellectual
property scheme. As Professor Edward Re reminds us: "'It is idle to suppose that such
knowledge ...

was not used; especially in the solution of those problems for which the

230
ancient customs made no provision."'
In England in 1769, a law suit brought by an owner of a literary creation, claiming a
right in the creation after statutory copyright protection expired, was one such problem
for which no specific provision had been previously made. The eighteenth-century
English jurists had a knowledge of civil law concepts that most United States jurists
today cannot claim, and they used this knowledge, along with other sources, while
solving this novel issue for which they had no precedent: whether a perpetual common
law copyright existed before the Statute of Anne and survived after the statutory term of
protection had run.
231
The outcome of the case was that a common law copyright was found to exist.
And this common law copyright was found to have pre-existed the time-limiting statute

Rome).225

See VAIDHYANATHAN, supranote 64, at 41 (noting that when the British relied on the common

law, "the rest of Renaissance Europe was busy adopting the rediscovered Roman legal code").
226For an overview of the development of copyright and moral rights law in France, see Chartrand,
supra note 69, at 230-33; DAVIES, supra note 110, at 129-77.
22
7A French court referred to the right of attribution as early as 1837. See Raymond Sarraut6,
Current Theory on the MoralRight ofAuthors andArtists UnderFrenchLaw,16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465,
478 (1968) (quoting D. Repertoire de Jurisprudence V, Prop. Lit. et Art. no. 194)
228See Swack, supranote 64, at 370, 373-74 (tracing the emergence of the droitmoralinFrance).
229
See generallyRe, supranote 199.
230
Re, supranote 199, at 469 (quoting JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 20 (2d ed. rev.
1922)). Professor Re describes much earlier use of Roman law concepts to fill in where there was a
paucity of English common law precedent. Re, supra note 199, at 471-75 (describing the borrowing of
Roman law form and substance in Henry de Bracton's Tractatusde Legibus et ConsuetudinibusAngiae
(1258)); see alsoVERSTEEG, supranote 223, at 269 (crediting Roman law with "a significant influence in
English law").
2:31As one scholar summarizes Millar:
The decision, handed down by Lord Mansfield's court, represents no less than a
triumph of creative historical revisionism and legal advocacy. Notwithstanding the
reality of the Statute ofAnne, and its immediate legal progeny, the history of the first
four decades of lawful book publishing in Britain had been carefully re-crafted. The
London monopolists had picked a number of disparate legal-historical threads, bound
them together within a compelling ontological framework, and created a new,
altogether different, coherent form. The perpetual common law right had literally
been written, talked and argued into existence.
DEAZLEY, supranote 68, at 178-79; see also BIRRELL, supranote 68, at 112 ("Aspecial jury verdict was
recorded in which the jury were made to repeat upon oath the cock-and-bull story of how long before
Queen Anne perpetual copyrights had been made the subject of family settlements for the provision of
Mrs. Bookseller and her babes.").
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and to be perpetual.2 3 2 The overall question had been whether copyright's existence was
limited by the statute; the statute supported author's economic rights, gave those rights
for only a limited time, and did not mention any aspect of moral rights. So the
arguments in favor of perpetual protection for literary works ended up being arguments
for the booksellers. Once again, in the twisting history of Anglo-American intellectual
property law, moral rights ended up on the side of the booksellers, helping to protect
their economic interests in maintaining their monopolies, rather than helping authors to
protect their personal interests in their works. The defendant, a rival bookseller, was
just trying to wrestle from a monopolistic bookseller a limited time period during which
he could capitalize on a work. When he lost, the old-line booksellers won. And moral
rights related arguments became firmly embedded in the booksellers' camp, strange
bedfellows indeed-and, eventually, fateful ones.
Interestingly, all the MiJ]arjusticesagreed that an author owned the copyright in
his work before it was published.233 This same principle is reflected in current American
23 5
copyright law23 4 and the French droit de divulgation.
Both these rights give an author
full control of a work before it is published, including the right to decide when, or even if,
he will part with his creation. And both these rights apply in the modern law to
"authors" in the United States copyright sense of the word, i.e., to literary, visual, and
performing artists. 236 Although providing copyright upon creation focuses on economic
control 237 and the droit de divulgationis concerned with creative control, 238 they provide
similar support for artistic decisions. 239 Perhaps this right is consistent in the two
intellectual property law schemes because it was such a well-accepted concept before the
English judges cut off the other moral rights for authors, allowing for its continuation,
reinforcement, and eventual extension to the visual and performing artists.

III. How DONALDSONLOPPED OFF THE BRANCH

232 While the notion of a perpetual intellectual property right may seem unusual to Americans, in
France artists' moral rights are perpetual. Law No. 57-298, art. 6.
233 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2331, 2340, 2355, 2396, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 221, 216, 229, 251 (K.B.
1769).
234
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000) ("Copyright in a work.., vests initially in the author... of the
work."); 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) ("Copyright in a work ... subsists from its creation ....").Under earlier
copyright statutes, a United States author had full control over when or even whether to publish a work,
see An Act to amend and consolidate the Acts respecting Copyright, ch. 320, § 2, Pub. L. No. 60-349
(Mar. 4, 1909) ([N]othing in this Act shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or
proprietor of an unpublished work .... to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished
work without his consent ..... ), although copyright itself did not exist before the formalities of
publication and notice, id. at § 9 ([A]ny person entitled thereto by this Act may secure copyright for his
work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this Act; ....
").
235Law No. 57-298, art. 56; seea
asoEden C. Whistler, CA Paris, 1898 D.P. 1 465, afTd, 1900 D.P. I
497 (Cour de Cassation) (holding that the artist could refuse to deliver a commissioned portrait even
after exhibiting it).
236 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
237 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (providing the right to, interahj],
sell, rent, or lease a copyright).
238 Law No. 57-298, art. 56.
239 Each law, of course, also provides the artist with some economic control of the work.
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A. Donaldson v. Beckett
The second seminal case brought under the Statute of Anne was Donaldson v.
241
Becket, in 1774.240 Like its predecessor, this case also was not decided in a vacuum.
The attorneys for each side had been involved in earlier copyright cases, including
Tonson v. Collins and Millar v. Taylor. 242 William Blackstone, who had been one of the
attorneys in Millar,was now on the bench, 243 and some of the other judges had been
244
involved in the earlier cases, too.
The facts in Donaldson have a familiar ring. In January 1729, the author, James
Thomson, sold to a bookseller, Andrew Millar (yes, the same Thomson and the same
Millar), the copyright in two works, a tragedy entitled Sophonisba and a soon-to-be
popular poem entitled Spring.245 In July 1729, Mr. Thomson sold the copyright to several
other poems to bookseller John Millan. 246 Among these were poems entitled Summer,
Autumn, Winter, and "A Poem Sacred to the Memory of Sir Isaac Newton."247 Then in
248
June 1738, Millan sold his rights in these works to Millar.
Interestingly, along with the books, the transaction included "the several plates of
the prints of the seasons, and the plate of the print of Sir Isaac Newton's monument; all
which prints had been usually bound up with the poems." 249 Thus, works of visual art
were part of the transaction that underlay the dispute. They were not specifically
mentioned in the reasoning of the case, however, and the Engravers' Act 250 was not
251
applied.
240 There are three main reports of this case:

(1) Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (K.B. 1774) (inserted at the end of
Burrow's report of MIl]ar);
(2) Donaldson v. Beckett, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774); and
(3) COBBETT'S PARL. HIST., supranote 69, at 954.
These reports differ in terms of the aspects of the case and the details they include.
241
Soo Tonson v. Collins, 1 Black. W. 301, 96 Eng. Rep. 169; Milar,4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201;
BIRRELL, supranote 68, at 121 (Indeed, "this was no lawyer's question. The question of literary property
was discussed everywhere and by everybody."); RANSOM, supranote 68, at 4 (suggesting that "[b]ecause
Englishmen attached great significance to written things, early copyright in England followed a course of
experience
almost as wide as national life").
242
See DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at 195.
2413Donaldson,2 Bro. P.C. at 145, 1 Eng. Rep. at 847 (listing the justices and how they voted on the
case); Dona]dsons, 4 Burr. at 2411, 98 Eng. Rep. at 259 ("Mr. Justice Ashurst delivered the opinion of
Mr. Justice Blackstone[,] who was absent, being confined to his room with the gout .. ").
24 4
Dona]dsons,4 Burr. at 2417, 98 Eng. Rep. at 262. Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice, recused
himself from the case, since he had already made his decision on the central legal issue known in Millar.
Id. ("It was notorious, that Lord Mansfield adhered to his opinion ....But it being very unusual (from
reasons of delicacy) for a peer to support his own judgment, upon an appeal to the House of Lords, he did
not speak.").
245 Donaldson,2 Bro. P.C. at 129, 1 Eng. Rep. at 837.
24 Id.at 129, 1 Eng. Rep. at 838.
247Jj
218
249 Id.

250 8 Geo. 2, c. 13.
251

In a select recitation of the history of the main issue, one of the attorneys did make a passing

reference to the 1767 statutory amendment giving protection to Hogarth's widow. COBBETT'S PARL.
HIST., supra note 69, at 962 (referring to, without citing, 6 Geo. 3, c. 38).
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Mr. Millar died in June 1768, and in January 1769, his executors auctioned off the
copyrights in the Thomson poems. Thomas Becket and the other respondents in
252
Donaldson were the highest bidders.
Meanwhile, in 1768, Alexander Donaldson printed a volume of poems by James
Thomson, entitled The Seasons (containing much the same underlying work as the
publication that was still in dispute in the Millar case), which included several of the
poems for which Millar had owned the copyright. 253 Donaldson was one of many Scottish
booksellers who over the years challenged the London booksellers' efforts to maintain
their monopoly. 254 He reasoned that if the poet sold the copyright in his new works in
1729, according to the Statute of Anne, the copyright would expire fully twenty-eight
256
years later in 1757.255 And so in 1768, Donaldson felt free to print and sell the poems.
As was the routine, 257 Becket and the other auction winners first sought an
injunction against Donaldson in the Chancery Court, in 1777.258 The Chancellor ordered
a perpetual injunction and an accounting of how much Donaldson owed Becket for the
259
sold copies, but Donaldson responded by appealing to the law courts.
The main legal issue squarely before the court in Donaldson was the same main
issue as in Mllar: was there a common law copyright that existed before the Statute of
Anne and that continued to exist after the statutory copyright term ended?2 60 In other
words, was there any type of copyright in the poems that Thomson transferred to Millar
and Millan, that continued to exist for more than twenty-eight years, so that Millar's
estate included these copyrights upon his death, or did Becket and the others spend their
money at auction on something that did not exist?
The Donaldson case was a close call, 261 and it seems to look in two directions
conceptually. In this watershed case of statutory interpretation, there were still
references to "natural rights" 262 and lingering mentions of principles dating back to
25 2

Dona] son, 2 Bro. P.C. at 130, 1 Eng. Rep. at 838.
Id.
254See ROSE, COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, at 5 (stating the Scottish booksellers sought "an
independent role for themselves as reprinters of popular titles").
255
Donalslon, 2 Bro. P.C. at 130-31, 1 Eng. Rep. at 838-39.
256
It does not require a great leap of imagination to suspect Donaldson perceived a window of
opportunity for making some money, when he learned Millar had died while his case still lingered in
court, without a final decision on the existence of the common law copyright.
257 See suprapp. 20-21.
258 Donaldson,2 Bro. P.C. at 130, 1 Eng. Rep. at 838; COBBETT'S PARL. HIST., supranote 69, at 955
253

n.*.

25 9

Donaldsons,4 Burr. at 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. at 257; Donaldson,2 Bro. P.C. at 132, 1 Eng. Rep. at

839; COBBETTVS PARL. HIST., supra note 69, at 955 n.* (all listing the five separate, but overlapping
issues in the case).
26 0
Dona]dsons,4 Burr. at 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. at 257-58; Donaldson,2 Bro. P.C. at 144-45, 1 Eng.
Rep. at 846-47; COBBETTVS PARL. HIST., supranote 69, at 970-71.
261 The decision was close on the key issue, with a vote of 6 to 5 to deny the existence of the common
law copyright. See BIRRELL, supra note 68, at 126-27 (listing each vote); DEAZLEY, supra note 68, at
199-205 (charting each judge's vote as reported in contemporaneous accounts and suggesting conflicting
reports); cf ROSE, COPYRIGHT, supra note 66, at 154-58 (suggesting the clerks may have counted wrong,
switching the direction of the slim margin).
262 See, e.g., COBBETT'S PARL. HIST., supra note 69, at 980-81 (Aston, J.) (arguing "in favour of
literary property from the natural rights of the subject" and voting for the perpetual common law
copyright).
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ancient Rome. 263 There was also a subtle shift, however, in the tone and emphasis,
particularly in the reports of the opinions of the justices who voted with the narrow
majority. 264 They articulated their ideas with language that sounds more familiar in
modern copyright law. For example, a few of the justices referred to books as "what was
now termed literary property,"265 showing an awareness that consensus was solidifying
around new nomenclature for evolving concepts. Chief Justice De Grey was well aware
he was working on changing the status quo, stating that the question before them could
266
"be fairly treated as a new question" and referring to "this new species of property."
267
He also rejected relying upon principles of "moral fitness."
In Donaldson,there was greater concern for the fair assignment of economic benefits
to the author, 268 as opposed to allowing economic control to vest early on and remain with
a publisher forever. But, repeating language from Milar, even where the decision
encourages an author to "become the guardian of his own fame,"269 evoking the "honor
and reputation" protected by moral rights, 270 the goal is that "learned and industrious
men will be enabled to reap not only the fame, but the profits of their labours .... "271
The acknowledged result is "the honour and advantage of themselves and their
families. '"272 So, even while the case focused more on economics, in late eighteenthcentury England, both honor and economic advantage were still commended in the same
breath by some of the jurists.
Donaldsonstands for the proposition that "[t]he statute of Anne was not declaratory
of the common law, but introductive of a new law, to give learned men a property which
they had not before." 273 So all that the booksellers Millar and Millan received from the
poet Thomson was a twenty-eight year copyright, and nothing remained after that to
auction off. And so Donaldson arrives at the opposite answer from Milar, and it is

2 3 Although the Solicitor General made a reference to Grotius (a Renaissance Dutch jurist) citing
Paulus (a Roman lawyer), COBBETT'S PARL. HIST., supra note 69, at 964, Justice Aston stated that "[i]t
was not necessary . . . to advert either to the Grecians or Romans to discover the principles of the
common law of England." Id. at 980. Lord Littleton also "traced the origin of the arts and sciences from
Greece to Rome ....
and at last seated them in Great Britain." Id. at 1002.
264 The reports summarize a great deal of the justices' oral opinions, and it is entirely possible that
the details which were printed were selected subjectively after the fact, when the outcome of the case
was known, and so slanted a bit towards the outcome.
2
65 COBBETTVS PARL. HIST., supranote 69, at 982, 985, 988 (Perrott, J.) (referring to "what was now
termed literary property"), (Adams, J.) (referring to "what was now termed literary property"), (De Grey,
Lord C.J.) (referring to "some interest in right of authorship ... ; which is termed literary property").
266 Id. at 990.
267 Id.; see also id. at 998 (Lord Camden) (rejecting arguments about "moral fitness").
2 8
6 For example:
It will continue to be the ingratitude of mankind, that they who teach wisdom
by the surest means, shall generally live poor and unregarded; as if they were born
only for the public, and had no interest in their own well-being, but were to be lighted
up like tapers, and waste themselves for the benefit of others.
Donaldson v. Beckett, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 143, 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 845-46 (H.L. 1774).
269 Id. at 142, 1 Eng. Rep. at 845.
270
Soo supra pp. 4-5.
271 Donaldson, 2 Bro. P.C. at 144, 1 Eng. Rep. at 845.
272 [d
273

Id. at 140, 1 Eng. Rep. at 843.
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Donaldson that sticks. 274
Donaldson is said to be the case that wiped out moral rights in Anglo-American
law. 275 Yet the way in which it so profoundly influenced the future of Anglo-American
intellectual property law276 was pretty tangential to the focus of the decision. The
justices were not voting directly about moral rights or any kind of dispute between moral
rights per se and economic rights. They focused on the historic dispute in England
between booksellers and authors, while also showing a growing understanding of the
public's interest.

27 7

Donaldsonshut the door on moral rights simply by settling the dispute in favor of
statutory copyright. By a one vote margin, Donaldson declared that there was no
copyright at common law and copyright was only a creature of statute. 278 If protection
for literary property came from the statute only, that protection was limited to the terms
of the statute. 279 The Statute of Anne had no provisions for moral rights. It created a
temporary monopoly, giving authors an opportunity, beyond the first sale of a
manuscript, by which they could benefit economically. Authors could sell a fourteen-year
copyright, 280 and then sell a fourteen-year renewal copyright. 281 The first ever copyright
statute simply did not account for non-economic values, beyond the hortatory language in
the preamble acknowledging the public's interest, 28

2

because its focus was wrestling

control of literary property away from the booksellers. It was a legislative act that set
283
the direction for the development of intellectual property law in common lawcountries.
And it was the Donaldson decision, applying the statute head on for the second time,
that closed the door on the development of moral rights in Anglo-American jurisprudence
284
for over 200 years.
4

27 Id. at 145, 1 Eng. Rep. at 847; see a]soBOWKER, supra note 223, at 26 ("This construction by the

Lords, in the case of Donaldson v. Becket, of the Statute of Anne, has practically 'laid down the law' for
England and America ever since.").
275
See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 221 (explaining the guild previously had recognized the moral
rights of authors and Donaldson "effectively eliminated [moral rights] from the Anglo-American
copyright tradition.").
276 See id. at 220 (asserting 'lilt
is this decision that established the basic concept of AngloAmerican copyright").
277 See COBBETT'S PARL. HIST., £upra note 69, at 999 (Lord Camden) ("Why did we enter into society
at all, but to enlighten on another's minds, and improve our faculties for the common welfare of the
species?"). The same three sets of interests continue to vie for attention in the copyright scheme in the
United States today. See Okediji, supra note 43, at 1640-41.
278 Donaldson, 2 Bro. P.C. at 145, 1 Eng. Rep. at 847.
279 Id.

8 Ann., c. 19, s. 1.
at s. 2.
282
1d. at pmbl.
283 See Liemer, Primer,supra note 26, at 41 n.4 (noting in some civil code countries the opposite
280

281-1d

dynamic occurred and moral rights began via judicialopinions).
284 By way of contrast, after the French Revolution, intellectual property law in France moved
forward in a very different way. See Chartrand, supr note 69, at 231-32. By the 1830's, French judges
began affirming artists' moral rights; Sarraut6, supra note 227, at 478. But see DAVID SAUNDERS,
AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 75-105 (1992) (suggesting the law was every bit as muddy and not
inevitable in its course for many years on the other side of the English Channel). The French
legislature, however, waited until 1957 to codify these rights. See DAVIES, supra note 110, at 150-55
(outlining the legislative history in France).
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Taking a very broad view, this history is not surprising. It follows the general
progression of legal history in the West, from royal decree and customary local usage, to
Enlightenment ideals and natural law concepts, to positive law's growth of statutory and
regulatory law. The fluke of history here is that moral rights ended up on the side of the
pro-monopolistic booksellers and not on the side of the authors and the public. 28 5 In
Donaldson,just as in Millar,two booksellers squared off in court. And again, arguments
on one side had the statute to rely on, a statue without moral rights provisions, while
arguments favoring booksellers' perpetual monopolies could rely on just about everything
else, including early moral rights concepts. Of course the irony is that moral rights
provide important protections for both authors 28 6 and the public 28 7 (protections that could
prove helpful still in disputes with our modern-day "booksellers"288), yet did not end up
on the side of the case aligned with the interests of authors and the public. On the other
side of the Atlantic, despite the delay caused by the American Revolution, 28 9 Donaldson's
strict statutory interpretation and its lack of moral rights considerations took hold in the
.290
United States

B. The New United States
There were many influences, both practical and philosophical, on copyright law in
the nascent United States, 291 and a thorough discussion of them lies beyond the scope of
this article. In brief, statutory copyright law, including the Statute of Anne, was known
in the American colonies 292 and in the early states. 293 Most of the early state statutes
were permutations of the Statute of Anne, with two or three dominant strains. 294 In
285 See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 221 (stating guild-recognized moral rights were eliminated
along with common law copyright).
28
6 See Richard Serra, SuppressionandLiberty: The TiltedAre Controversy, 19 CARDOzO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 39, 39-46 (2001) (explaining how lack of legal protection before VARA resulted in forced
dismantling of his federally commissioned sculpture); Grace Glueck, Bank Cuts up a NoguehiSeuipture
and Stores It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1980, at Al (reporting no protection for integrity of a sculpture, a
decade before VARA); Diane Rose, Calder's "Pittsburgh:'AViolated and Immobile Mobile, ARTNEWS,
Jan. 1978, at 39 (reporting county airport officials relocated mobile sculpture, made it immobile, and
repainted it, to prevent drivers from rubbernecking).
28 7
See Merryman, Public Interest,supra note 112, at 363.
288 See infra p. 36.
281)See Chartrand, supranote 69, at 223 (indicating there was a lack of trade in law books during
the Revolutionary War).
290 See infra p. 34. Perhaps it is because of the delay, however, that the concept of a common law
copyright, potentially applicable to matters not covered by statute, remains in play in the United States
to this day. See infra note 324.
291 See, e.g., Chartrand, supra note 69, at 223-29 (examining competing influences on the new
nation's copyright law); Shirata, supra note 88, at 199-203 (describing the mixing-and mixing up-of
natural rights law, common law, and regulatory control).
292See Shirata, supra note 88. at 196 (reporting a Massachusetts law in 1672 that concerned
copyright and then no other indigenous statutes until 1780).
293
See DAVIES, supra note 110, at 76-77 n.1 (listing and describing the state statutes); Shirata,
supranote 88, at 196-202 (including a chart of the title and date of each state's legislation); Fred Fisher
Music Co. v. M.Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 649-51 (1943) (reviewing the state statutes).
291 See Shirata, supranote 88, at 200 (mapping the level of influence of the Statute of Anne in the

[5:1 2005]

How We Lost Our Moral Rights

addition, the Framers knew the history of the Stationers Company's monopoly and the
295
Mllar and Donaldsonprecedents.
Drafting the Constitution, authority for a federal statute was accounted for in the
Copyright Clause: "Congress shall have the Power ... To promote the Progress of Science
... by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to
their. . Writings.
...296 Exercising this power, Congress enacted 297 the first United
299
States copyright statute in 1790.298 Its ancestry in to the Statute of Anne was obvious.
Its title started by stating it was an "Act for the Encouragement of Learning,"300 just as
the Statute of Anne's title did.301 The 1790 statute's title explained the method for
encouraging this learning: "by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the
authors and proprietors of such copies.
... 302 The Statute of Anne's method had been
30 3
"by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies."
The differences in the new statute were obvious, too, even in the wording of the title.
More types of works were covered, with the inclusion of maps and charts.3 0 4 Instead of
306
"Authors or Purchasers," 305 the 1790 statute's title refers to "authors and proprietors,"
and then "authors," "proprietors," and "persons ... who hath legally acquired the
copyright" appear in the text itself.3 0 7 This shift in language reflects the fact that the
1790 statute did not have to wrestle monopolistic control away from a long-standing
guild. The historical context of the Statute of Anne had forced Parliament to emphasize
the interests of authors and the reading public. 30 8 The new United States, however, was
not worried about putting too much market power in the hands of "proprietors." Indeed,
its leaders were anxious to build indigenous industries and an economic
infrastructure. 309
The public's interest was certainly an important part of United States copyright law
from its beginning. The goal, however, was not learning to just generally enlighten the
thirteen states); Fisher,318 U.S. at 648 ("In this country the copyright laws enacted by the original
thirteen
states prior to 1789 were based largely upon the Statute of Anne.").
295
See Chartrand, supranote 69, at 223-30; VAIDHYANATHAN, supranote 64, at 44 (stating James
Madison and Noah Webster were "mindful" of copyright history when working on copyright law).
296 U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 8; see also BOWKER, supra note 223, at 7 (stating the constitutional
grant to Congress followed England's post-Donaldsonapproach to copyright).
297 See H.R. Bill 43, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (1790); see also THORVALD SOLBERG, COPYRIGHT IN
CONGRESS 1789-1904, Copyright Office Bulletin No. 8,29, 114-23 (1905) (listing the precursor bills and
petitions to Congress, committee charges, committee reports, etc.).
298
Act for the Encouragement of Learning, Act of May 31, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
299 See, e.g., Fisher,318 U.S. at 650 ("As might have been expected, this Act reflected its historical
antecedents."); BOWKER, supranote 223, at 24 (referring to the Statute of Anne as "the foundation of the
present copyright system of ... America").
300 1 Stat. 124, title.
'01 8 Ann., c. 19, title.
'302 1 Stat. 124, title.
303 8 Ann., c. 19, title.
304 1 Stat. 124, title.
30 5
' 8 Ann., c. 19, title.
'306 1 Stat. 124, title.
307 Id. at s. 1.
30 8
See suprap. 9-11.
'309 Soo DAVIES, supra note 110, at 28 (stating the underlying philosophy was that "encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain [was] the best way to advance public welfare").
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mind (except for in political matters)310 or to create art for art's sake. The leaders of the
day understood the need to build a national identity, to encourage a unique American
culture-culture in the broad sense of the term, that is, not necessarily culture in any
elevating sense. And so intellectual property that supported industry was the focus.
Nonetheless, the first Congress worked within practical legal concepts with which it
was familiar. The Copyright Act of 1790 granted a fourteen-year monopoly, 311 and
allowed a renewal for a second fourteen years, 3 12 just as the Statute of Anne had. Even
without a local history that included the Stationers Company, the old guild's
requirement of recording the copyright in a register 313 and depositing a copy of the
work 314 remained.
Perhaps even more important than the outlines of the Statute of Anne that survived
eighty years, an Atlantic crossing, and the Revolutionary War, is the fact that the case
law interpreting it survived, too. Despite the provision for copyright in the Constitution,
copyright law quickly became a matter of statutory analysis, 315 following in the footsteps
of Donaldson,316 rather than an area for constitutional analysis. 317 The first copyright
case decided by the United States Supreme Court, Wheaton v. Peters,318 set the tone, by
relying on statutory interpretation. 319 For those matters not covered by the new statute
but already covered by the common law, particularly for pre-publication copyright issues,
cases in the United States continued to refer to Donaldson to find a common law
copyright. 320 With the focus on statutory interpretation, and no mention of moral rights
'310 President George Washington, Speech ofthe Presidentof the United States to both Houses of

Congress, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 8, 1790), reprinted in SOLBERG, supra note 297, at 115-16
(advocating the "promotion of science and literature" to teach "the people themselves to know and to
value their own rights").
'3i' 1 Stat. 124, s. 1.
312Id.
313

Id.at s. 3. The federal District Court clerk was assigned the recording task at first. Id. Now the

task falls to the Copyright Office in the Library of Congress. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2000).
31 1 Stat. 124, s. 4. The depository was originally in the Secretary of State's office, id., and now it is
in the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress. 17 U.S.C. § 407(b) (2000).
315 See Hamilton, Deference, supranote 13, at 323-25.
316 See Shirata, supra note 88, at 203 (stating that the United States Supreme Court's first
copyright case "was along the lines of traditional English theory established in Donaldson").
'317
SeeHamilton, Deference, supranote 13, at 321 (tallying sixty-one United States Supreme Court
copyright cases interpreting the statute and only five interpreting the Copyright Clause).
31 8
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 667-68 (1834).
'319See Shirata, supranote 88, at 203 (explaining how Wheaton "adopted a strict literal construction
of the statute"); Chartrand, supranote 69, at 226 (concluding "the Court also rejected what later became
known as the 'moral' rights of authors"); see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 291
(1907) ("In this country it is well settled that property in copyright is the creation of the federal statute
passed in the exercise of the power vested in Congress" by the Copyright Clause.).
320Even in the recent, major case of Eldred v. Asheroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), the parties argued a
fine point about common law copyright, but the Court declined to jump into that fray. Id. at 196 n.3.
Other federal and state cases through two centuries have cited Donaldsonas authority on the existence
of a pre-publication common law copyright. See, e.g., Crowe v. Aiken, 6 F. Cas. 904, 905-06 (N.D. Ill.
1870) (citing both Millar and Donaldson to find a pre-publication common law copyright); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 2005) (finding common law copyright
protection for musical recordings, extending since the time of Donaldson); see also 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)
(2000) (stating the federal copyright statute does not limit any existing common law rights for matters
not covered by the statute).
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in the statute until 1991, moral rights simply did not develop in the United States.
Very little of the Engravers' Act crossed the Atlantic or had much impact on United
States copyright law. 321 In the United Kingdom, protection for engravers and a
gradually expanding list of visual artists was not merged into the main copyright statute
until 1842,322 too late to directly influence the United States law. Engravings did receive
copyright protection in the United States starting in 1802,323 mostly by amending the
1790 statute to cover engravings. 324 The 1802 amending statute borrows the Engravers'
Act's prohibition against copying "in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to, [or]
diminishing from the main design,"3 25 but it lacks the bold preamble of the Engravers'
Act, with its clear concern for the artists' creative interests. 326 The early intellectual
property law in the United States did not develop protection for these creative
interests. 27 The focus remained on the Statute of Anne and the 1790 statute.
Conditions favored the continual development of copyright's economic protection,3 28 while
the moral rights evolutionary branch did not emerge in the United States for another 200
years.

IV.

CONCLUSION: EVOLUTION CONTINUES

Until VARA, the strong economic focus of United States copyright law allowed for
little legal recognition of other values. 329 Over the years, in a smattering of cases here
and there, judges have recognized that there are other values inherent in intellectual
property and worthy of protection, even when they had no statutory or case precedent

321I

could not find a single case in the United States that referred to the Engravers' Act, and I had

to contact the Library of Congress to obtain a copy of the statute's text. By way of contrast, more than
1,000 federal and state cases refer to the Statute of Anne, and its text is easily available. See DAVIES,
supranote 110, at App. 1,371-76; DEAZLEY, supra note 68, atApp. 1,233-38; RANSOM, supranote70, at
109-17; http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
'322 Copyright Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45 (Eng.).
32 3
Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, 6 Stat. 171 (1802); see alsoVAIDHYANATHAN, supranote 64, at 45.
4
32 6 Stat. 171.
'32 5 _d.
'326 8 Geo. 2, c. 13, pmbl.
327 See, e.g 143 Kilty's English Statutes 122 (1811) (listing 8 Geo. 2, c. 13, among the English
statutes not applicable in Maryland).
328See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (limiting authors'
protection in favor of "progress of... useful arts") (citation omitted); Kwall, 'Author-Stories,"supra note
13, at 20 (" [T]he United States' capitalist culture and its classical utilitarian tradition also contributed to
the development of a copyright doctrine more concerned with commodification than the creation
process."); Suhl, supra note 43, at 1214-15 (describing the commodification of intellectual property in the
United States and the law's market-dominated culture); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 64, at 20
(asserting copyright has evolved "into one part of a matrix of commercial legal protections"). The
economic focus has been so pervasive, a system similar to negotiable instruments has even been
recommended to protect creative works. See Julie Levy, Creative Works as Negotiable instruments.A
Compromise Between Moral Rights Protectionand the Need for Transferabilityin the UnitedStates, 5
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 27, 30 (2003).
329 See Swack, supranote 64, at 362 (reporting that "in the United States, the artist or copyright
owner is granted... 'economically exploitable rights,' meant both to 'encourage artists to create' and to
'enrich society at the least cost to consumers."').
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authority on which to rely.33 0 For the most part, however, values protected by moral
rights have been foreclosed from recognition. 331 The door was closed so tightly for so
long, that even after limited moral rights were on the books,33 2 a federal court could
partially excuse a municipality's ignorance of those rights and total destruction of a
33 3
protected work of art.
Of course, those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it. 4 So it is
particularly important for jurists and legislators to understand this history now, as
conditions and issues parallel to those in the eighteenth century confront our intellectual
property law. Once again, new technology allows copying and distributing with an ease
and at a pace previously unimaginable. 335 Once again the law is struggling to catch up to
the new technology, as those who create works and those who distribute the works vie for
economic benefits, while the public's interest remains the third party in the debates.
And once again, those who create works seek protection for their personal interest in
their work and the creative process. In England, it took a couple of hundred years for the
necessary legal concepts to develop and mature into settled law that could account for
the new technology of printing, and in that historical process cut the important values
were lost, values protected by moral rights.
In our internet age, given the accelerated rate of technological change,33 6 the
330See, e.g., Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1883) (considering the
author's reputation when stating in dicta, "no person has the right to hold another out to the world as
the author of literary matter which he never wrote"); Clemens v. Press Publ'g Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206, 20708 (N.Y. App. Term 1910) (Seabury, J., concurring) ("While an author may . . . sell his literary
productions, yet the purchaser.., cannot make as free a use of them as he could for the [barrel of] pork
which he purchases."); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 589 (2d Cir. 1953) (Frank, J., concurring) ("[I]t is
an actionable wrong to hold out the artist as author of a version which substantially departs from the
original."); Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 25 (2d Cir. 1976) (stretching Lanham Act and contract
interpretation to cover unauthorized modification of broadcast Monty Python sketches).
331
See, e.g., Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 194 Misc. 570 (N.Y. Sup. 1949)
(holding no moral rights protection for permanently walled-over fresco); Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs.
Admin., 664 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), dismissedin part,667 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd,
847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding no moral rights protection, pre-VARA, for controversial public
sculpture, now dismantled and stored); Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d
575, 578-89 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1948), affd, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949) (holding no moral rights protection for
music); Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), qf,-d, 81 F.3d 319 (2d
Cir. 1996) (holding no VARA protection for written work, including a law review article); Pavia v. 1120
Ave. of the Americas Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620, 628-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding no right of integrity for
work modified before passage of VARA and still on display after passage ofVARA); Kaplan v. Lily of Fr.,
No. 95-Civ- 1046, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7640 (S.D.N.Y. June 4,1996) (holding no moral rights protection
for a photograph); Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582-83 (7th Cir. 1997); Gegenhuber v. Hystopolis
Prods., No., 92-C- 1055, 1992 WL 168836, (N.D. Ill. July 13, 1992) (holding no VARA right of attribution
for puppets, costumes, sets, or the "creation, design, and direction" of a puppet show); Flack v. Friends of
Queen Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 535 (2001) (finding that asking someone else to finish artist's
sculpture did not violate right of integrity under VARA); Silberman v. Innovation Luggage, Inc., 2003
WL 1787123, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2003) (holding no VARA protection for reproductions of a
photograph, i.e., no VARA protection for the original image).
'332 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506; see supra pp. 2-4.
3 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
334

GEORGE SANTAYANA, 1 THE LIFE OF REASON: INTRODUCTION AND REASON AND COMMON SENSE

284 (1905).
533
See Chartrand, supra note 69, at 233 (comparing the printing press to digitization).
:36 See ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 11-14 (1970).
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necessary legal concepts are likely to develop in a more abbreviated time frame. Because
internet technology encourages a global perspective, perhaps as we look forward our
common-law jurists may gain better appreciation for moral rights protection, already
well-developed in other countries, by taking a look back at our own law's early
development.
With VARA, moral rights are once again an ingredient in the genetic mix of our
intellectual property law's evolution. They should not be delegated again to an
evolutionary branch that leads to extinction. Moral rights law should continue to have a
place on the main evolutionary branch, to protect important, non-economic values
inherent in the creative process and all creative work.
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